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SECURITIZING AUDIT FAILURE RISK
INTRODUCTION
This Article contributes a new transactional alternative to
address risks of catastrophic audit failure: having auditing firms
issue bonds, called catastrophe bond securitizations, to capital
markets to provide coverage for these risks. This innovation follows
from this Article's analysis of longstanding debates about the
relative merits of establishing caps on damages for auditing firms
in securities liability cases. In those debates, a common argument
favoring caps is the absence or limited availability of insurance to
address the liability. This forces auditors to resort to self-insurance
programs that they operate through captive affiliates. This Article's
transactional proposal responds to this insurance-based argument.
On the evidence available, self-insurance appears to be better
than external insurance, such that the insurance-based argument
does not necessarily support damages caps. The former bundles risk
monitoring and distribution within audit firms whereas the latter
separates the two functions. Even if the argument is valid, more-
over, this inquiry reveals superior alternatives that can be designed
to address losses arising from audit failure. These are: (1) financial
statement insurance, which has been discussed in the literature and
tailors coverage to risks of ordinary audit failure; and (2) catastro-
phe bond securitization, which has not been mentioned in the
literature and is introduced here as a way to pool and distribute
risks of catastrophic audit failure through capital markets. The
former bundles risk monitoring and distribution within insurers,
while the latter re-bundles them outward to capital markets.
This Article thus tentatively concludes that the insurance-based
argument favoring damages caps warrants analytical skepticism.
Analytical skepticism is the most the conclusion can reach, however,
because the evidence available for a definitive determination is
limited. Auditing firms, which are privately owned, provide virtually
none of the public information necessary to evaluate these issues.1
Auditing firms do not publicly disclose any meaningful information
about their financial condition or results, disclosing instead sum-
mary data on assets and total worldwide revenues broken down by
1. See infra Part II.B.1.
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geographic region and business line.2 They provide no disclosure
concerning internal or external insurance models or capacity and
only cursory information about internal organizational structures,
controls, or governance. In the course of some of the following
analysis, therefore, an inferential picture of practices will be
developed.
Subject to those limits, after reviewing the terms of the debate
and introducing basic principles concerning the role of insurance in
public policy governing auditing, this Article explores two alterna-
tive models that exist and two that could be created to address
auditor liability for audit failure. The first of the two existing
models is, of course, traditional professional liability insurance. This
insurance is still commonly obtained by smaller and medium-sized
auditing firms and was once commonly used by the four large
auditing firms but now only to a modest, specialized extent. What
is remarkable about this form of insurance is how it separates
monitoring by auditors from distribution of the risk of audit failure.
This separation or unbundling of risk monitoring and risk distribu-
tion can contribute comparative disadvantages to the audit function.
In comparison, the second of the two existing models is the more
recently evolved self-insurance program. Beginning sometime in the
late 1970s and early 1980s, the large auditing firms all developed
highly sophisticated internal structures using captive insurance
affiliates to manage and fund exposure to legal liability for audit
failure.3 While some participants in the debate view this as evidence
of the firms' dire straits, analysis supports the view that the
decision to self-insure is both rational for the firms and relatively
appealing systemically. Most notably, compared to the unbundling
and separation of functions that external insurance presents, self-
insurance programs bundle the monitoring and risk distribution
functions together within audit firms.
As for two new possible alternatives to address audit failure, the
first is financial statement insurance, which has been discussed
somewhat in the literature and is summarized briefly here. Rather
than auditors using professional liability insurance or self-insuring
against the risk of liability from audit failure, this insurance covers
2. For an example, see infra notes 108-11 and accompanying text.
3. See infra note 106 and accompanying text.
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particular financial statements. Issuers buy coverage from exter-
nal insurers which, in turn, engage auditors to conduct financial
statement audits; the resulting insurance then covers those
statements. Like self-insurance, this device bundles monitoring and
risk distribution, although it bundles them into insurers rather than
into audit firms. Even so, in a regime of financial statement
insurance, existing commercial insurers as well as existing audit
firm captives could compete to underwrite coverage.
The second novel alternative is insurance-based securitization,
which has not been mentioned in the literature and is introduced
here. Since 1995, financial innovators have packaged insurance-like
products into securities using special purpose entities that pool and
distribute risks through capital markets.4 Insurance securitizations
have concentrated on risks of catastrophic loss arising from such
phenomena as hurricanes and floods. But, to date, they have not
included professional liability insurance of the kind auditors have
obtained externally or developed internally. Although this market
remains young and thin, as it matures and deepens, it could be an
attractive vehicle to contribute resolution to the longstanding
debate over damages caps for auditors by establishing a vehicle to
cover catastrophic losses.
An intriguing feature of insurance-based securitization of risks of
audit failure is how this concept could partially re-bundle the risk
monitoring and risk distribution functions outward to capital
markets. Investors could essentially invest in functional insurance
policies covering the risk of audit failure. Using capital markets
could reduce the insurance market volatility that appears to be at
the heart of insurance-based arguments favoring damages caps. It
could add pressure on auditors to promote audit effectiveness and
possibly reduce the incentives that plaintiffs' lawyers have to pursue
excessive damages claims against auditors of public companies-an
important adjunct of such insurance-based arguments. Best of all,
it could precisely address catastrophic audit failure risk, which most
seem to agree is the most important context in which damages caps
warrant serious policy consideration.
Part I of this Article summarizes the audit function and debates
over damages caps. The latter are often supported by lamenting a
4. See infra Part III.B.
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lack of insurance, absence of insurability or, sometimes, an
"insurance crisis." Part II considers existing insurance for audit
failure. It evaluates how audit failure risk may be better addressed
by self-insurance than by traditional liability insurance because of
closer bundling of risk monitoring with risk distribution. Part III
explores potential insurance for audit failure. It reviews previous
proposals for financial statement insurance to address ordinary
risks of audit failure and then introduces the novel idea of
insurance-based securitization to address catastrophic risks of audit
failure.
I. AUDIT FAILURE: RISK AND CONTROL
The following discussion introduces the parameters and stakes of
the audit function, considers public policy matters implicated, and
addresses the role of insurance in policy design. The stakes of audit
failure are potentially staggering when only four large firms are
competent to audit the vast majority of public enterprises. This has
revived debates dating back several decades about whether the law
should set limits on the amount or type of damages auditors face for
audit failure, in which proponents often cite the relative absence or
expense of related insurance.
A. Audit Constituents and Stakes
The audit function addresses multiple constituent classes and,
within each class, many variations of type. The primary constituent
class is investors, who range from sophisticated institutions to retail
clients investing personal funds. The secondary class is issuers, who
can be of any form, including non-profits and for-profits, private
enterprises or public enterprises. Tertiary constituents include
other participants in financial reporting, chiefly an issuer's officers
and directors-especially its audit committee-and professional
advisors, mainly lawyers and underwriters. The latter group also
includes insurers of issuers, directors, and officers, and professional
service firms, including auditors, regulators-mainly the SEC, but
also state, securities, and insurance regulators-and courts.
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As a group, auditors exhibit some variation in kind. They may
usefully be grouped into three tiers by size-either by total reve-
nues, or by total employees or professionals, which tend to be
commensurate measures. The largest firms generate annual global
revenues approaching $20 billion each, employ more than 100,000
people each (a large portion of whom are accounting professionals),
and operate in nearly every country in the world. There have never
been more than eight firms in this league in recent decades, and
there are presently only four-which increasingly bear a fairly
homogenous character.5 A mezzanine tier of medium-sized firms
generates a fraction of those revenues, with a fractional employee
base: their revenues are closer to $1 billion at the high end of the
scale.6 Thousands of yet smaller firms, meanwhile, populate the
third tier in the accounting profession. The four largest firms audit
the vast majority of public enterprises in the world, although
mezzanine tier firms audit a meaningful share.
At stake in any audit for a given issuer is the production of
relevant and reliable financial statements that enable investors to
make efficient capital allocation decisions. At stake for the audit
function as a system is social welfare, which is a product of the
relative efficiency of overall capital allocation. Investors buy
securities from issuers in part on the strength of reported account-
ing. The reports are prepared by management and attested to by an
auditor, under the supervision of an audit committee.
Audit failure occurs when an auditor incorrectly issues an opinion
that financial statements fairly present an issuer's financial con-
dition and results in conformity with generally accepted accounting
principles (GAAP). Under federal law, a limited risk of auditor
liability for negligence exists in connection with initial securities
offerings, although most federal law actions involve secondary
market trading and require a showing of scienter for private
actions.' On the other hand, under many state laws, negligence
5. See infra notes 112-15 and accompanying text.
6. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRMS: MANDATED STUDY ON
CONSOLIDATION AND COMPETITION 47 (2003), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
d03864.pdf [hereinafter STUDY ON CONSOLIDATION].
7. Principal federal laws are section 11 under the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77k
(2000), and section 10(b) under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2000).
The latter applies to secondary trading in securities and exposes auditors to liability under
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liability risk is considerable when relaxed privity standards apply
instead of the more rigorous traditional privity requirement
established in Judge Cardozo's classic opinion Ultramares Corp. v.
Touche.' Federal law imposes further jurisdictional limitations on
what kinds of securities-related claims may be brought in state,
rather than federal, court.9
The magnitude of legal liability that auditors face for audit failure
ranges from routine claims not posing systemic calamity-claims in
the range of $10,000 to $250,000 whose significance for individual
firms varies with firm size-to episodic claims involving hundreds
of millions of dollars that could be systemically catastrophic. The
frequency of relatively routine exposures is meaningful but not
catastrophic: for smaller firms, perhaps once per year, and for larger
firms, perhaps a dozen per year.10
Debate exists concerning the relative probability of auditor
liability in larger cases, which some confidently believe is high,
while others are less certain." Federal securities fraud class actions
fraud theories if scienter is shown; the former applies to registered public offerings of
securities and exposes auditors to nominally strict liability, which becomes essentially a
negligence standard because auditors can defeat liability by showing reasonable investigation
and belief. Section 11 liability also depends on the investor's ability to prove tracing. Other
relevant federal laws include section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)
(2000), which imposes on auditors the duties of inquiry and disclosure, and section 18(a) of
the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78r (2000), which creates private rights of action
against persons, including accountants, who "make or cause to be made" materially
misleading statements in reports or other documents filed with the SEC.
8. 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1931). The privity rule essentially forecloses public shareholder
claims against auditors. See id. at 444-48. Beginning in the 1980s, several state law cases
overturned that principle, including Rosenblum v. Adler, 461 A.2d 138 (N.J. 1983), although
a few courts clung to a watered-down version of the privity rule based on a foreseen plaintiff
principle as articulated in the Restatement (Second) of Torts. See Bily v. Arthur Young & Co.,
834 P.2d 745, 757-58 (Cal. 1992) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977)).
Auditors also face a remote chance of criminal liability for audit failure that, if it occurs, can
have high-magnitude effects. See United States v. Arthur Andersen, 374 F.3d 281,289-91 (5th
Cir. 2004), rev'd on other grounds, 544 U.S. 696 (2005); Kathleen F. Brickey, Andersen's Fall
from Grace, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 917, 930 (2003). But criminal liability cannot be effectively
addressed using either insurance or caps on damages.
9. See Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112
Stat. 3227 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) [hereinafter SLUSA] (restricting
securities fraud class actions to federal court, although not covering individual actions or
derivative litigation in state court); see also Richard W. Painter, Responding to a False Alarm:
Federal Preemption of State Securities Fraud Causes of Action, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1998).
10. See infra text accompanying notes 83-84.
11. Two models suggest high probability of a medium-term, litigation-induced exit by one
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against auditors are few, but the size of resulting damages or
settlements can be staggering, with four recent settlements
reaching into the $200 and $300 million range and two others also
exceeding $100 million. 2 At much higher levels, it could be impossi-
ble for an auditing firm to continue in the face of such a payout.
Whichever view in the debate on probability is correct, the magni-
tude of loss is overwhelming; it could spell the demise of one of the




Policy discussions, which date back decades, have considered
mechanisms to improve the audit function and manage systemic
effects of audit failure. Analysis has concentrated on promoting
year-to-year audit effectiveness, striking the optimal level of
deterrence based on liability standards, and, particularly in recent
years, preventing cataclysmic audit failure.
Two kinds of tools can be used to promote the effectiveness of the
audit function. The first concerns structural arrangements designed
to induce professional skepticism and objectivity among auditors.
The second concerns liability devices designed to deter auditors and
their clients from temptations to misreport. The liability system is
of the four large auditing firms. See LONDON ECONOMICS & RALF EWERT, STUDY ON THE
ECONOMIC IMPACT OF AUDITORS' LIABILITY REGIMES 164 (2006) [hereinafter EWERT, EU
STUDY] (examining existing and possible caps on auditor damages in Europe); Eric L. Talley,
Cataclysmic Liability Risk Among Big Four Auditors: An Empirical Analysis, 106 COLUM. L.
REV. 1641 (2006).
12. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge of Fashioning
Relevant Reforms, 84 B.U. L. REV. 301, 342 (2004) (detailing five settlements through 2004
exceeding $100 million: settlements of $110 million, $125 million, $217 million, $250 million,
and $335 million); Talley, supra note 11, at 1670 (noting Fortress Re settlement in 2005 of
$250 million). Despite these figures, it is not uncommon for commentators or judges to speak
of the potential of "billion dollar judgments" against auditors. See, e.g., Bily, 834 P.2d at 764
(expressing concern about the "specter of multi-billion dollar" judgments against auditors);
John Cummings, Top of Mind: Do Accountants Need Liability Protection?, BUS. FIN., Apr. 7,
2007, at 10 (quoting Deloitte CEO Robert Kueppers as concerned about "a multibillion-dollar
claim" and mentioning figures of $3 billion, $5 billion, or $10 billion).
13. Lawrence A. Cunningham, Too Big To Fail: Moral Hazard in Auditing and the Need
To Restructure the Industry Before It Unravels, 106 COLuM. L. REV. 1698, 1775 (2006)
[hereinafter Cunningham, Too Big To Fail].
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also designed, in part, to provide compensation to investors who
suffer damages from audit failure caused by violations of law.
Policymakers and scholars endlessly work to refine these tools, in
light of dynamically changing circumstances, to achieve the optimal
system. Throughout related debates, arguments for limitations on
auditing firm liability tend to change over time as markets, reforms,
and laws evolve, but they invariably and steadily appeal to absence
or expense of insurance.
1. Audit Effectiveness
Considerable changes have been made in the past five years in an
effort to promote more effective audits. A leading example is the
creation of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board
(PCAOB) as an oversight body to supervise and regulate the public
company auditing industry. 4 Specific reforms designed to improve
audit effectiveness include: (1) requiring audit committee supervi-
sion of the audit function; (2) tightening limits on an auditor's right
to provide non-audit services to audit clients; and (3) providing for
audits of internal control over financial reporting."6 Some propo-
nents of capping auditor damages cite these changes to support the
prescription.6
Although such reforms would likely improve the audit function
and reduce risk of audit failure, their probable success is qualified.
Before considering qualifications as to each of the foregoing reforms,
a continuing structural feature constraining audit effectiveness
14. COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REGULATION, INTERIM REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON
CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION (2006), available at http://www.capmktsreg.orgtpdfs/11.30
CommitteeInterimReportREV2.pdf [hereinafter PAULSON COMMITTEE REPORT].
15. This is a partial list of reforms mandated in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, but these are the
main reforms. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (Supp. IV 2004). More
modest reforms include federal law mandating audit partner rotation on given engagements
every five years. This is only a modest reform, however, because the previous rotation
requirement was set at seven years. Bolder reform would require audit firm rotation, but this
poses difficult questions that are hotly debated, including whether the familiarity that arises
from repeat audits is a benefit that outweighs any gains-such as from independence,
objectivity, or competition-from mandatory firm rotation. See generally U.S. GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRMS: REQUIRED STUDY ON THE POTENTIAL
EFFECTS OF MANDATORY AUDIT FIRM ROTATION (2003), available at http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d04216.pdf.
16. See, e.g., PAULSON COMMITEE REPORT, supra note 14, at 86-87.
[Vol. 49:711720
SECURITIZING AUDIT FAILURE RISK
must be emphasized: issuers still pay their auditors. This creates an
inherent conflict of interest that can impair auditor objectivity and
thus reduce audit effectiveness. Many proposals have been made to
eliminate this conflict, yet none have been adopted in the United
States. 
17
As for reforms that have been made, PCAOB faces inherent
limitations as a matter of institutional capability to promote
effective auditing. True, PCAOB appears to be a more proactive
overseer than its predecessors, but that conscientiousness has
created credible political objections to its performance. These
objections have led political leaders and regulatory officials to
reconsider many of its efforts.
The striking example concerns PCAOB's standards governing
audits of internal control over financial reporting. Although such
audits can increase financial statement reliability, this is the
leading context in which participants have alleged that PCAOB
overreached.'" Accordingly, not only is PCAOB's existence a non-
compelling argument for establishing caps, but criticism of its
handling of internal control audits also neutralizes the argument
favoring caps based on the existence of those audits.
17. Alternatives have been proposed to address the payment conflict for auditors as well
as for other intermediaries, including financial statement insurance, public funding, funding
through stock exchanges, and voucher financing programs. See, respectively, Lawrence A.
Cunningham, Choosing Gatekeepers: The Financial Statement Insurance Alternative to
Auditor Liability, 52 UCLA L. REV. 413, 427-29 (2004) (proposing that, instead of having
companies pay auditors, companies should be authorized to buy insurance and have insurers
hire and pay auditors); Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking the Disclosure Paradigm in a World
of Complexity, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 29 & n.180 (suggesting but discounting the possibility
of having gatekeepers such as auditors paid through public funding); Larry E. Ribstein,
SarbOx: The Road to Nirvana, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 279, 289 (proposing that stock
exchanges coordinate and compensate auditors (citing Paul M. Healy & Krishna G. Palepu,
How the Quest for Efficiency Corroded the Market, HARv. Bus. REV., July 2003, at 76));
Stephen J. Choi & Jill E. Fisch, How To Fix Wall Street: A Voucher Financing Proposal for
Securities Intermediaries, 113 YALE L.J. 269 (2003).
18. See Press Release, SEC, SEC Commissioners Endorse Improved Sarbanes-Oxley
Implementation To Ease Smaller Company Burdens, Focusing Effort On 'What Truly
Matters" (Apr. 4, 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2007/2007-62.htm. At its
open public meeting on July 25, 2007, the SEC approved a replacement standard governing
audits of internal controls over financial reporting in lieu of the one that the PCAOB initially
adopted. See Christopher Cox, Chairman, SEC, Opening Remarks at the SEC Open Meeting
(July 25, 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech2007/spch072507cc.htm.
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As to audit committee supervision, this may be one of the most
important of the recent reforms. 9 For many enterprises, this reform
can strongly promote audit effectiveness. Marking an important
shift, recent reforms require that members of audit committees
possess some expertise in financial accounting.2 ° This is a striking
change in corporate governance discussions, which for several
generations have emphasized the quality of independence rather
than expertise.2 There is emerging evidence that having expertise
on the audit committee increases the quality of financial reporting.22
That said, reliance on this important innovation may be pre-
mature.2 3
Although evidence is mixed, limiting non-audit services may pro-
mote audit effectiveness, 24 and in any event creates other concerns.
19. See William W. Bratton, Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley and Accounting: Rules Versus
Principles Versus Rents, 48 VILL. L. REv. 1023, 1034-36 (2003) (noting the importance of
empowering audit committees to supervise auditors, discuss auditor-management
disagreements, and retain their own professional advisors).
20. See, e.g., Listing Standards Relating to Audit Committees, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10A-3(b)
(2007) (codifying Exchange Act Rule 10A-3(b)); Standards Relating to Listed Company Audit
Committees, Exchange Act Release No. 8220, 68 Fed. Reg. 18,788 (Apr. 25, 2003).
21. The trait of director independence emerged as an important value in corporate
governance when the monitoring board replaced the advisory board during the 1970s. See
Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 1950-2005: Of
Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REv. 1465, 1514-15 (2007). Ever
since, independence, rather than expertise, has been the clarion attribute of "good" corporate
governance. See Donald C. Langevoort, The Social Construction of Sarbanes-Oxley, 105 MICH.
L. REv. 1817, 1826 (2007).
22. See Jean Bedard et al., The Effect of Audit Committee Expertise, Independence, and
Activity on Aggressive Earnings Management, 23 AUDITING: J. PRAC. & THEORY 13 (2004);
Gopal V. Krishnan & Gnanakumar Visvanathan, Does the SOX Definition of an Accounting
Expert Matter? The Association Between Audit Committee Director's Accounting Expertise and
Accounting Conservatism 10-13 (July 29, 2000) (unpublished working paper), available at
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=866884.
23. For example, an emerging debate concerns whether audit committee experts and
others engaged in the financial reporting process should promote a financial statement
orientation towards equity investors or debt investors. At stake is the degree to which
historical cost or fair value accounting should be preferred. This hinges, in turn, on issues
such as whether value relevance (usefulness) or efficient debt contracting are important
components of the demand for accounting reports. See, e.g., Ray Ball, Ashok Robin & Gil
Sadka, Is Accounting Conservatism Due to Debt or Equity Markets? An International Test of
"Contracting" and "Value Relevance" Theories of Accounting (Oct. 26, 2005), available at
http://www.csom.umn.edu/Assets/51165.pdf; see also Lawrence A. Cunningham,
Independence, Expertise and Accounting (Aug. 2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author).
24. See, e.g., William R. Kinney, Jr., Zoe-Vonna Palmrose & Susan Scholz, Auditor
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At present, some issuers of public securities face limited or no choice
of auditors, and if only three large audit firms were to exist, many
would have no choice. This restricted choice, which exists in part
because of the small number of capable firms, is amplified by both
legal limits on non-audit services that firms can supply to clients
and the auditing industry's practice of firm specialization in certain
industries. To the extent that only such a small coterie of firms are
capable of auditing the vast majority of public enterprises, a risk
arises that firm partners and employees may consider their firms
"too big to fail," which could impair rather than promote effective
auditing.25 Damages caps could have a similar unintended side
effect.
2. Deterrence
The second category of tools available to promote effective
auditing concentrates on deterrence, both as to auditors and their
clients. Deterrence strategies pursue designing the optimal type and
scope of legal duties and liabilities that should be placed on auditors
and others. As with structural tools, policymakers and scholars
regularly reevaluate system design and the law periodically changes
in response to debates. Issues include the standard of liability,26 the
Independence, Non-Audit Services and Restatements: Was the U.S. Government Right?, 42 J.
ACCT. RES. 561 (2004); see also Jayanthi Krishnan, Heibatollah Sami & Yinqi Zhang, Does
the Provision of Nonaudit Services Affect Investor Perceptions of Auditor Independence?, 24
AUDITING: J. PRAC. & THEORY 111 (2005) (noting mixed results of empirical research on the
effect of non-auditing services on auditor independence, investigating whether investors
perceive such an effect, and interpreting the results affirmatively).
25. See Cunningham, Too Big To Fail, supra note 13.
26. See Michael R. Lane, Legislating Accountant's Third-Party Liability, CPA J. (June
1989) (surveying various standards of liability risk of accountants to third parties, including
negligence and various tests of privity, intentionality, and foreseeability). Compare
Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1931) (limiting liability of accountants for
ordinary negligence to third parties), with Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976)
(restricting Section 10(b) actions to scienter, not negligence).
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scope of exposure," and adjective devices, such as statutes of
limitation," pleading standards," or jurisdictional limitations."
Detailed exploration of this terrain is unnecessary to conduct this
Article's principal inquiry, except to note that optimality means
sufficient deterrence at reasonable cost. Suboptimality can arise
from a liability regime in which potential damages are so high that
they induce over-auditing or so high that imposing them on a firm
could lead to its dissolution and eventually cause the auditing
industry to unravel. It is possible to address these problems by
creating limitations on damages. Various types of limitations are
possible, including safe harbors, proportionate liability, and stated
damages caps-which, in turn, can assume many forms.31
Safe harbors can fairly and usefully be justified for certain
auditing practices. An example concerns audits of internal control
over financial reporting to the extent that auditors make forward-
looking statements in their related reports on the relative effective-
ness of those controls." These safe harbors have not been adopted
and this Article does not address them directly. This Article does
27. See Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 177-78
(1994) (holding that section 10(b) does not expose auditors or other professionals in private
litigation to liability for aiding and abetting securities fraud); see also Donald C. Langevoort,
Words on High About Rule 10b-5: Chiarella's History, Central Bank's Future, 20 DEL. J. CORP.
L. 865 (1995); Robert A. Prentice, Locating That "Indistinct"and 'Virtually Nonexistent"Line
Between Primary and Secondary Liability Under Section 10(b), 75 N.C. L. REV. 691 (1997).
28. For section 10(b) actions, the current statute of limitations period is two years from
constructive knowledge, subject to a maximum five-year period of repose. 28 U.S.C. § 1658(b)
(2006) (negating Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350 (1991),
which provided a one-year-from-constructive-knowledge limitations period subject to a three-
year period of repose, and in turn altering the traditional judicial approach of borrowing the
relevant limitations period from the analogous common law fraud context).
29. See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 127 S. Ct. 2499, 2504-05 (2007)
(holding that plaintiffs pleadings must support a "strong" inference of scienter: "more than
merely plausible or reasonable[, the inference] must be cogent and at least as compelling as
any opposing inference of nonfraudulent intent"); Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 311 (2d Cir.
2000) (interpreting pleading standards that Congress enacted in 1995 to endorse the pre-
existing Second Circuit approach requiring that pleadings demonstrate "strong inference" of
scienter); see also In re Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d 525, 530 (3d Cir. 1999).
30. See SLUSA, supra note 9.
31. An additional functional cap arises when firms opt to use the limited liability
partnership form of business organization, which all four large auditing firms have adopted
since this became possible in the early 1990s. See generally Larry E. Ribstein, Limited
Liability of Professional Firms After Enron, 29 J. CORP. L. 427 (2004).
32. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Facilitating Auditing's New Early Warning System:
Control Disclosure, Auditor Liability and Safe Harbors, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 1451, 1468 (2004).
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contribute insights, however, concerning any arguments supporting
safe harbors that are based on the absence or limited availability of
external insurance.
As to proportionate liability, in 1995, the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) eliminated joint and several liability
for negligence, replacing it with liability in proportion to fault.33
This is, in substance and effect, a functional damages cap.
34
Proportionate liability limits auditor liability at the level of
culpability so that auditors are not exposed to all losses from
financial calamity arising after an audit failure occurs. A theoreti-
cal defense of this limitation was made in 1984 by Professor Ebke."5
The analysis emphasized the need for a link between the extent of
auditors' fault and the resulting liability.36
As to stated damages caps, these have been debated since at least
the 1970s. a7 Three varieties can be identified: fixed dollar, variable
dollar, and fixed percentage. They can be implemented by legisla-
tion, regulation, or contract. A primary criticism of any variety of
caps, of course, is that they reduce the deterrent effect of the
liability threat. But that criticism misses the point, which is to
33. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2000)).
34. See EWERT, EU STUDY, supra note 11, at 205-06.
35. See Werner F. Ebke, In Search of Alternatives: Comparative Reflections on Corporate
Governance and the Independent Auditor's Responsibilities, 79 Nw. U. L. REV. 663 (1984)
(studying negligent accountant cases altering Ultramares, preceding Bily). Professor Ebke
also mentioned, in passing, another option for risk distribution by creating a federal insurance
fund akin to the FDIC. See id.
36. Professor Ebke also recommended that state courts adapt federal law's scienter
standard into their analysis of non-privity cases. Id. at 696. He suggested that if scienter
could be shown, then liability could expand to parties not in privity with the auditor, but that
privity should be required in all other cases, including negligence cases. Id. Doing so is
appealing because the scienter standard keeps auditor liability within reasonable bounds
while extending it to all foreseeable third parties; since insurance generally excludes coverage
for scienter, liability's deterrent effect remains.
37. See, e.g., T.J. Fiflis, Current Problems of Accountants'Responsibilities to Third Parties,
28 VAND. L. REv. 31 (1975) (proposing damages caps measured in terms of revenue for given
client or total revenue). For a sampling of the literature across the decades, see Constantine
N. Katsoris, Accountants' Third Party Liability-How Far Do We Go?, 36 FORDHAM L. REV.
191 (1968); David L. Menzel, The Defense of Contributory Negligence in Accountant's
Malpractice Actions, 13 SETON HALL L. REV. 292 (1983); Michael A. Mess, Accountants and
the Common Law: Liability to Third Parties, 52 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 838 (1977); Howard B.
Wiener, Common Law Liability of the Certified Public Accountant for Negligent
Misrepresentation, 20 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 233 (1983).
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design the system to achieve optimal deterrence, not maximal
deterrence.38 A cap could contribute to the optimum. 39
Professor Ebke also evaluated fixed dollar caps in 1984. He noted
that the main benefit of fixed caps is to improve risk analysis, by
either the auditing firms or their insurers.4 ° Optimal design would
assure that auditor exposure is not out of proportion to auditor gain.
Yet to be effective for risk analysis, the amounts of both would have
to be relatively low. 41 But this means, in turn, that fixed caps per
case would be both unfair and ineffective. When the limit is too low,
it would lead to nominal recoveries; however, even low limits that
provided fair recoveries could still pose a catastrophic risk for
auditors.42
If the main concern is the catastrophic case, then the cap would
be some fairly large number today, in the range of $450 million to
$2 billion; for smaller firms, perhaps $30 to $100 million.43 That
could help with cutting out the mega-claim, but does not meet
38. Damages caps are not an uncommon component of a liability system's design. Early
examples appeared in maritime law. See Limitation of Liability Act of 1851, 46 U.S.C. § 181
(2000) (seeking to encourage investment in shipbuilding by capping owners' liability at
vessel's net value). Other examples appear in the ALI's Federal Securities Code, insider
trading class actions, and some state corporate laws, as well as those sought by auditors for
decades. See, e.g., COMMISSION ON AUDITORS' RESPONSIBILITIES: REPORT, CONCLUSIONS, AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 154 (1978); R. JAMES GORMLEY, THE LAW OFACCOUNTANTS ANDAUDITORS:
RIGHTS, DUTIES AND LIABILITIES 17-11 (1981).
39. Two additional challenges are federalism within the United States and global
coordination worldwide. Within the United States, any effective cap would require federal
legislation that preempts contradictory state laws. Furthermore, given that the four large
firms are global in scale, an additional challenge would be assuring worldwide adoption of
caps. Efforts to overcome these obstacles are ongoing. For example, both the UK Parliament
and the European Union (EU) are flirting with the notion of damages caps. When first
proposed, however, the Statute for European Companies and the Fifth Company Law
Directive of the European Community did not provide statutory limitations on auditor
damages. See Ebke, supra note 35, at 695 n.172. The EU's pending project on the Eighth
Company Law Directive has commissioned a study of the subject. See EWERT, EU STUDY,
supra note 11, at xxiv; see also Directorate General for Internal Market and Services,
Summary Report, Consultation on Auditors' Liability (Oct. 2007), available at http:/ec.
europa.eulinternal marketlauditing/docs/liability/summary.report-en.pdf (summarizing
public comments on European proposal to consider capping damages against auditors).
40. Ebke, supra note 35, at 694-95.
41. Id. at 694.
42. Id. at 695.
43. See Talley, supra note 11, at 1679 (estimating viability thresholds of large auditing
firms in terms of what level of damages they could support before likely electing to dissolve,
with estimates from $454 million to $2.15 billion).
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Professor Ebke's objection about being sufficiently low to enable
superior risk analysis. Risks below that level are just as analytically
tractable or intractable as without any cap.
In contrast, Professor Fiflis's 1975 proposal offered a variable
dollar cap proposal. It would cap damages either (1) for a given
client's audit, at a multiple of fees received from that client during
a stated period, or (2) for all clients, at a multiple of revenues from
all clients for a period." Critics of Professor Fiflis's proposal
observed that investors in companies audited by smaller auditors
stand to recover less than investors in companies audited by larger
ones.4" That would increase audit industry concentration, as
enterprises would tend to appoint larger firms. That would, in turn,
hurt smaller firms and increase prices, and could reduce audit
quality and hurt investors if demand is relatively inelastic. This
critique is particularly apt today, when encouraging additional
rivals to the dominant four firms is, for many, an important policy
objective.46
The debate continues today. Professor Partnoy offers a fixed
percentage approach to establishing caps on auditor liability for
audit failure.47 He envisions statutory authorization permitting
auditors and their clients to contract for allocation of damages from
audit failure according to a stated split.4" A question about the fixed
percentage approach is whether it nevertheless could bankrupt an
auditor. Even a small percentage of a large judgment could produce
auditor insolvency. As a result, Professor Coffee prefers the
approach offered earlier by Professor Fiflis.49 Another concern about
the fixed percentage approach is how publicity of such arrange-
ments could also harm smaller firms, which are less able to commit
to high allocations; if such harm is possible, this approach poses the
same adverse effects as multiples-based caps.
Related pending debates consider the extent to which auditors
and clients should be permitted, in engagement letters, to control
44. See Fiflis, supra note 37, at 113 & n.304.
45. See Ebke, supra note 35, at 695.
46. See STUDY ON CONSOLIDATION, supra note 6, at 25, 46.
47. See Frank Partnoy, Strict Liability for Gatekeepers: A Reply to Professor Coffee, 84
B.U. L. REV. 365, 365-66, 375 (2004).
48. See id.
49. See Coffee, supra note 12, at 341.
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liability contractually. Examples apart from the fixed percentage
proposal are contracts that require alternative dispute resolution
rather than jury trials, or expressly exclude punitive damages.5 °
Debate has also addressed the optimal vehicle to establish any caps.
Examples of alternative means of implementing a cap are by
regulatory formula, as in the proposals by Professors Fiflis and
Coffee; contractual negotiation, as in Professor Partnoy's proposal;
or by insurance-driven measurements, a proposal by Professor
Ronen that I have endorsed.51
3. The Insurance Argument
All the various proposals mentioned above, the relative merits
of which are beyond this Article's focus, share a common argu-
ment supporting them in principle: the relative expense or limited
availability of insurance.52 The insurance-based argument is
ultimately that simple, but more complex variations of the argu-
ment appear. The first is the more subtle claim that the cause of
expensive or limited insurance is legal uncertainty and/or unpredict-
ably expanding legal liability. Professor Ebke's 1984 analysis, for
example, expressed concern that increased civil litigation against
auditors increases insurance premiums or restricts its availability
"at any price."53
50. See generally Council of Institutional Investors, Roundtable Discussion on Auditor
Agreements: Discussion Summary (Nov. 10, 2005), available at http://www.issproxy.com/pdf/
AuditorRoundtableDiscussionSummaryNov2005.pdf; InteragencyAdvisoryon the Unsafe and
Unsound Use of Limitation of Liability Provisions in External Audit Engagement Letters,
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/srletters/2006/SR0604al.pdf (last visited
Nov. 23,2007) (opposing such provisions). Notably, the exclusion of punitive damages already
exists under federal securities law and under many state laws.
51. See Joshua Ronen, Post-Enron Reform: Financial Statement Insurance and GAAP
Revisited, 8 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 39, 48-60 (2002) (arguing issuers should obtain insurance
at predetermined levels to cover their financial statements with benefits that include
increased investor monitoring of financial statement reliability); see also infra notes 175-78
and accompanying text.
52. Although the merits are beyond this Article's scope, it is worth noting two important
facts about proposing that all auditor liability matters be established by contract rather than
tort law: (1) considerable agency costs are embedded in the existing corporate governance
structure, which limits the probability that managers interact with auditors in favor of
investor interests; and (2) the oligopoly of the auditing industry restricts issuer choice and
reduces audit firm incentives to compete on service or product variation.
53. See Ebke, supra note 35, at 690.
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The second is the more dramatic claim that rivets concern not on
the quotidian case but on the catastrophic case from that unpredict-
able expansion: staggering liability threatening auditing firm
insolvency with systemic ripple effects that could demolish the
entire auditing industry. In the late 2000s, for example, proponents
of establishing damages caps for auditors arising from audit failure
contended that caps below catastrophic levels "would allow insurers
to re-enter this market. Insurance would ... allow audit firms to
price risk and create a source of recovery for shareholders."54
Although these more subtle and dramatic claims are worth sep-
arate attention, they ultimately do not make much of a difference to
the basic argument from relative expense or limited availability of
insurance standpoints. After all, legal uncertainty is endemic and
pervasive, so it cannot be eliminated for auditing and is not unique
to it. And auditor-friendly reform efforts are not directed so much at
promoting legal certainty, but at limiting legal liability. That is the
essence of a cap, for instance, which does not so much increase legal
certainty as simply put an upper financial limit on legal judgments.
Indeed, legal certainty and predictability could be provided by a
law such as one that always makes auditors strictly liable in the
amount of $200 million for every audit failure. Yet despite the
certainty and predictability of such a law, insurance could remain
expensive and limited. This is due, in part, to the fact that uncer-
tainty is a prerequisite to the effectiveness of insurance. As
explained in the next section, events that are certain to occur do not
benefit from the risk distribution function that insurance can
provide.
True, unpredictability can impair insurance effectiveness and
present catastrophic risk that insurance cannot cover. Analysis and
empirical evidence, however, indicate that expensive or limited
insurance is not due solely to unpredictably expanding liability and
accompanying catastrophic risk, but also to traditional insurance
limitations arising from moral hazard, adverse selection, and the
rarity of catastrophic cases.55 As explored in Parts II and III of this
Article, although these matters pose difficulties for existing and
54. PAULSON COMMITEE REPORT, supra note 14, at 14.
55. See Peter Moizer & Lisa Hansford-Smith, UK Auditor Liability: An Insurable Risk?,
2 INT'L J. AUDITING 197, 205-08 (1998); see also infra text accompanying notes 138-58.
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potential insurance to address quotidian and catastrophic risk from
audit failure, they also reduce the insurance-based argument to the
basic claim of expense or limited availability of insurance, rather
than implicating the more subtle or dramatic theories about legal
uncertainty or unpredictably expanding liability.
However conceived, the insurance-based argument resonates
forcibly during periods when insurance markets contract. Insurance
markets expand and contract cyclically through periods designated
as either "hard" or "soft" markets, in cycles that approximate seven
years.56 As a thumbnail sketch of such cyclicality, the market for
professional liability insurance for auditors hardened considerably
from the late 1970s through the early and mid-1980s, in partial
response to increasing risk of negligence liability for audit failure;5 7
the market then softened in the late 1980s;58 it hardened again in
the early 1990s in response to the dissolution of the firm of
Laventhol & Horwath;59 the market remained hard for a few
56. See FRANK CRYSTAL & CO., INSURANCE MARKET OVERVIEw 5 (Winter/Spring 2006) ("A
hard market is one in which insurance rates increase (net written premiums increase
substantially) and coverage tends to be relatively restricted. A soft market is one in which
rate reductions are common (net written premium increases only nominally) and broad
coverage terms are readily available. The cycle from hard market, to soft market, and back
to hard market occurs regularly at a peak-to-peak or trough-to-trough interval of
approximately seven years.").
57. See John Siliciano, Negligent Accounting and the Limits of Institutional Tort Reform,
86 MICH. L. REV. 1929, 1950 n.111 (1988) (reciting evidence from: (1) the late 1970s, of a
"sharp premium rise and exit of some firms from insurance market" (citing H. JAENICKE, THE
EFFECT OF LITIGATION ON INDEPENDENT AUDITORS 4 (2d ed. 1981)); (2) the early 1980s, of loss
claims that "resulted in insurance becoming unavailable or prohibitively expensive" (citing
Stephen H. Collins, Malpractice Prevention and Risk Management, J. ACCT., July 1986, at 52);
and (3) the mid-1980s, that the number of E&O insurers to small and mezzanine firms shrunk
from twelve to three).
58. See Dan L. Goldwasser, Accountants' Liability 1989: The Year in Review, in PLI
CORPORATE LAW AND PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 11, 28-29 (PLI 1989) (noting
market softening which led to: (1) insurers writing policies for small and medium-sized firms
with larger limits of liability; (2) insurer Crum & Forster, under an AICPA sponsored
program, being induced to increase limits to $5 million from $1 million; and (3) entry of Home
Insurance Co. and Orion Insurance Co.; yet, still noting difficulty of large firms obtaining high
limit coverage and facing large deductibles, so that insurance covered only catastrophic loss
levels-meaning large firms must "in essence" self-insure smaller claims).
59. See Robert A. Prentice, Can the Contributory Negligence Defense Contribute to a
Defusing of the Accountants'Liability Crisis?, 13 WIS. INT'L L.J. 359, 360-61 (1995) (claiming
high level of unresolved claims plus legal costs and demise of Laventhol & Horwath "made it
nearly impossible for the [large auditing] firms to find insurance, and has caused
approximately forty percent of smaller firms to go without insurance altogether"); id. at n. 13
730
2007] SECURITIZING AUDIT FAILURE RISK
years-and this appeared to be global rather than U.S.-specific;6 °
then it softened again in the late 1990s in partial response to the
PSLRA, but has hardened yet again since the early and mid-2000s
amid both accounting scandals and resulting regulatory reform.61
The professional liability insurance market for auditors should
soften further to the extent that such reforms increase audit
effectiveness and reduce liability risk from audit failure. At present,
the market remains hard."
This cyclicality, which is explored at more micro levels in the next
Part, presents a preliminary implication. Proposals to cap liability
that are supported by arguments about a lack of insurance may be
unable to respond to the dynamics of those markets. A legal
mechanism would have to be in place to suspend and reinstate caps
as insurance markets fluctuate. Given competing demands on
lawmakers and the difficulty of fashioning legislation that includes
(citing Michael Schachner, Big Six Losses Don't Add Up To Cover Crisis for Small Firms, Bus.
INS., Nov. 22, 1993, at 3 (suggesting that "capacity has all but evaporated for Big Six firms,
causing several to entirely self-insure")); id. ('Those who do buy insurance are paying much
more than previously. Auditors, for example, are paying three times the premium with six
times the deductible as compared to 1985. Some firms are paying premiums of $150,000 per
year-more than is paid by most surgeons-for the reduced coverage." (citations omitted)).
60. See Carl Pacini, Mary Jill Martin & Lynda Hamilton, At the Interface of Law and
Accounting: An Examination of a Trend Toward a Reduction in the Scope of Auditor Liability
to Third Parties in the Common Law Countries, 37 AM. BUS. L.J. 171, 220-21 (2000)
("[A] uditors have been unable to spread or socialize risk through the purchase of professional
liability insurance. The unavailability of liability insurance may also reduce the quality of
corporate financial reporting."). The authors went on to make an international comparison,
noting that:
In the United States, large accounting firms are now able to buy only a portion
of the coverage they could buy prior to 1985 and only for much higher premiums.
Virtually all mid-size firms tend to be highly underinsured. Liability insurance
for small firms is expensive with almost 50% not carrying any insurance at all.
In the United Kingdom, below $75 million the Big Five retain the risks
themselves as self-insurance using their own captive insurance companies. The
effective ceiling on coverage is $340 million. In Canada and Australia, the scale
of the problem is such that auditors are finding it increasingly difficult to obtain
insurance and that where it is available it is extremely expensive.
Id. at 384 (citations omitted).
61. See Dan L. Goldwasser, M. Thomas Arnold & John H. Eickemeyer, Professional
Liability Insurance § 11.2.1, in ACCOUNTANTS' LIABILITY (Aug. 2006) [hereinafter Goldwasser
et al., ACCOUNTANTS' LIABILITY] ("Although the market for professional liability insurance
softened in the late 1990s, it has become tighter in the wake of the accounting scandals in
2001-2002 and the subsequent regulatory response.").
62. See FRANK CRYSTAL & CO., INSURANCE MARKET OVERVIEW, supra note 56.
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sufficient prospective flexibility, a legislative solution to the
challenge is not likely to work. The observation does point in a more
promising direction. It could be desirable to develop mechanisms
that reduce insurance market volatility, if not strategies that would
expand and sustain availability for all time. 3
The insurance-based argument for caps raises numerous issues,
including the following: Are insurers really not willing to provide
this insurance? Is there really little or no insurance available? How
does the existence of large firm self-insurance programs affect the
analysis? Are damage caps really necessary to support the efficacy
of the audit function? If rejuvenating insurance is appealing, are
there alternatives that would enable doing so? For example, could
insurance cover financial statements rather than auditors? This
could contribute a mechanism other than fiat to establish caps,
assuming caps were desirable, and thus at least address risks of
ordinary audit failure. Finally, could audit failure risk be distrib-
uted more widely by securitizing this risk through capital markets?
Could insurance-based securitization reduce the volatility of
professional liability insurance markets? Could it at least be used
to address the specific concerns associated with catastrophic audit
failure risk?
C. The Role of Insurance
Before pursuing such questions in the next two Parts, some
initial perspective on the role of insurance in system design is in
order. It may seem backwards to design the parameters of a liability
system in relation to the capacity of insurance coverage to meet it.
The system should set liability to achieve optimal deterrence, or
perhaps, compensation. But determining such an optimum requires
examining all system components, including out-of-pocket costs
imposed on targeted actors; the share of losses to be absorbed by
insurance, indemnification, or other devices; the consequence of
insurance losses as translated into future premiums, and so on. In
this calculus, it is reasonable to evaluate the role and capacity of
insurance in overall system design.
63. See infra text following note 222.
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1. Optimality
Allowing that insurance capacity should inform system design
does not mean that its availability should be the basis for enlarging
liability levels by assuming its continued availability, nor should its
lack of availability be the basis for the opposite. Insurance and
similar resources cannot be assumed to exist or not to exist.
Insurance affordable today may not be affordable tomorrow, and
vice versa.64 Accordingly, the investigation that follows is not
intended to reach conclusions concerning the exact design of the
liability system, or the precise role insurance availability or
unavailability should play in that design. Rather, it is intended to
identify and estimate the scope of available insurance and how to
expand its availability so that the maximum level of potential
resources can be identified. That knowledge can then be used to
inform system design."5
Nor is this to conclude that maximizing the aggregate available
insurance is necessarily ideal. Perversely, expanding insurance
capacity can actually reduce recoveries available to injured parties,
and this can frustrate any compensatory objectives that a liability
system may be intended to achieve. 6 This peculiarity more nearly
raises questions about the function of compensation in the liability
system compared to deterrence, yet the two goals continue to play
64. See, e.g., Siliciano, supra note 57, at 1948-49 (criticizing "the standard bromide of
modern tort law: the use of insurance to offset tort liability..." then citing and discussing H.
Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 461 A.2d 138 (N.J. 1983), which "concluded that because
accountants have been able to obtain malpractice insurance against claims made directly by
their clients, there was 'no reason to believe' they could not similarly insure against third-
party claims," and noting how this belief is "dangerously misguided").
65. See George L. Priest, The Antitrust Suits and the Public Understanding of Insurance,
63 TUL. L. REV. 999, 1000 & n.6 (1989) (opining that "few would dispute that a central
ambition of a civilized society is to maximize the availability of insurance against all forms
of prospective loss," and that "this conclusion is the heart of the most influential philosophical
justification for the modern state" (citing JOHN RAwLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971))).
66. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence
and Its Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1553 n.74, 1585 (2006). But cf. Roberta
Romano, What Went Wrong With Directors'and Officers'Liability Insurance, 14 DEL. J. CORP.
L. 1, 4 (1989) ("The availability of insurance need not lead to an increased level of misconduct:
in a competitive insurance market, even if insurers cannot monitor insureds perfectly, they
can adjust insurance contract terms and offer partial insurance to mitigate the moral hazard
of insurance inducing suboptimal levels of care by insureds." (citing Steven Shavell, On
Liability and Insurance, 13 BELL J. ECON. 120 (1982))).
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at least some role in policy design. Still, evaluating claims concern-
ing lack of insurance and optimal system design, including as to
damages caps, can be improved by an appreciation of the range and
type of insurance products that could be fashioned to address risks.
2. Statistical Independence
Risks are susceptible to the risk management functions of
insurance if they are statistically independent of one another. The
risk of audit failure leading to legal liability generally satisfies this
condition. It cannot be predicted with certainty and it is not
necessarily random. Auditors can make reliable predictions and can
even influence outcomes. But fraud can be hidden, illegal acts
obscured, measurements imprecisely made, papers lost, and rogue
managers evasive. Audit failures occur through ordinary careless-
ness, actual negligence, gross negligence, and sometimes scienter.
Some audits are failures but are never uncovered as such.67
If these matters could be controlled, then prediction would be
perfect. At the extreme, if two events both are certain to occur,
insuring them does not contribute to risk pooling or distribution;
even if two events are not certain to occur, but are likely to occur in
exactly the same circumstances, insurance cannot contribute to risk
distribution. But if the risks have probabilities of occurring and
those probabilities arise from different circumstances, then
insurance is useful to pool and distribute both risks. Because there
is invariably some non-random chance of audit failure, as there is
with death, earthquakes, floods, and clouds on title, the condition is
generally met: the risk of any given audit failure is statistically
independent of the risk of any other, and non-correlated, audit
failure.6"
67. Bishop Berkeley might have asked, as with trees falling in unpopulated forests,
whether an undiscovered audit failure is really an audit failure.
68. "Generally" is used because there is some reason to believe that certain kinds of audit
failures-or audit failure risks-congregate in particular industries or proliferate during
certain economic environments. See David B. Kahn & Gary S. Lawson, Who's the Boss?
Controlling Auditor Incentives Through Random Selection, 53 EMORY L.J. 391, 428 (2004).
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3. Limiting Probability
Two broad categories of strategies can be deployed to address
risk by managing its two components: limiting the probability of
occurrence, and limiting the magnitude if it does occur. As to
limiting probability, common examples outside auditing are driving
carefully, using fire-resistant materials in buildings, installing
safety devices on machines, and engineering beach erosion protec-
tion.
For auditing, steps to reduce the probability of legal liability
from audit failure include the reforms in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
discussed earlier: installation of PCAOB as an oversight body for
the industry; vesting audit committees with direct supervisory
power over individual auditors; limiting the scope of non-audit
services; and providing testing of and opinions on the effectiveness
of internal controls.69 Additional devices include increased probing,
strategic detection tools, investing in training of personnel, and
having multiple teams of professionals review the performance of
the engagement, as when a firm dispatches an engagement team
but provides oversight by the national office.
4. Limiting Magnitude
Limiting magnitude means taking steps designed to reduce the
effects of a loss once it occurs. Non-audit examples are using air
bags and seat belts when driving, installing sprinkler systems in
buildings, and providing first aid kits on shop floors. For auditing,
steps include prompt disclosure of corrections, swift preparation of
financial restatements, continuous disclosure and, especially to
address collateral effects, delisting of issued securities when they
are accompanied by materially misleading financial statements.
Magnitude-limiting steps include developing reserve funds available
to meet such losses without disrupting an ongoing enterprise.
Investors may exert themselves to reduce the magnitude of audit
failure. A key device available to them is diversification.7" Under
69. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
70. In theory, public company shareholders are entitled to vote to ratify the selection of
independent auditors. In practice, however, this selection is made by audit committees.
Rational shareholder apathy limits the exercise, and there is limited choice for most large
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modern portfolio theory, investors can reduce the risk of a single
stock price drop by owning opposite-behaving stocks or a group of
differently behaving stocks.71 The result is that peculiar risks
associated with given securities are reduced, for the price of also
reducing the "risk," or positive chance, of a single stock price surge. 2
This theory is designed to address business volatility rather than
effects precipitated by financial misstatements, but the strategy
nevertheless can reduce the latter's effects.
5. Distributing Residual Risk
Some risk remains even after taking prudent steps to reduce
probability and magnitude. The traditional way to distribute resid-
ual risk is by transferring it to another party using an insurance
contract.7' Risk-averse persons are willing to pay a relatively small
but steady amount to avoid shouldering the risk of a possible one-
time, staggering payout. Insurance enables people to do so.
At the limit, insureds can completely eliminate their risk for the
price of their premium: they opt for a certain small loss instead of
an uncertain large loss. And if insureds renew annually, they opt for
a certain stream of small losses in exchange for eliminating an
uncertain large loss. Insurers profit by pooling these individual risk
aversion payments to generate a resource base that exceeds the
aggregate amount of probable losses.74 This pooling function thus
not only transfers risk, but also distributes risk across all insureds
in the pool.75
Although risk aversion is generally assumed to obtain across a
wide range of persons to whom insurance appeals as a risk distribu-
tion mechanism, risk aversion can vary with absolute and relative
stakes. The standard example of risk aversion illustrates this point.
It imagines a person facing a choice between a certain loss of $500
and a 50 percent chance of losing $1,000, meaning an expected loss
enterprises. See EJAN MACKAAY, THE ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION AND LAW 175-76 (1982).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. See id. at 176-77.
74. See id. at 173-74, 176-80; A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND
ECONOMCS 53-58 (2d ed. 1989).
75. See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DIsTRIBUTINGRISK: INSURANCE, LEGAL THEORYAND PUBLIC
POLICY 2 (1986).
736 [Vol. 49:711
SECURITIZING AUDIT FAILURE RISK
of $500. People who are risk averse choose the certain loss, as they
are averse to the risk of doubling it, while risk-preferring people
take that chance, and risk-neutral people are indifferent.
To see how risk aversion can vary with absolute stakes, imagine
how increasing the stakes affects the distribution of persons who
are risk averse, risk neutral, or risk preferring. The population of
persons who are risk averse tends to increase as the stakes rise:
given a choice between a certain loss of $1 and a 50 percent chance
of losing $10,000 (meaning an expected loss of $5,000), very few
offered the choice would roll the dice.
To see how risk aversion can vary with relative stakes, consider
how a decision maker's background position affects choices made in
the foregoing examples. Suppose that persons in the first example
command, respectively, a net worth of $1,000 and of $1,000,000. In
that fact pattern, the former person will be more risk averse to the
uncertainty of a $1,000 loss compared to the millionaire, for whom
such a loss is a drop in the net worth bucket. A potential insured's
relative wealth can thus be an important driver of relative risk
aversion.
Even so, the more risk averse one is, the more one is willing to
pay to avoid risk. Avoidance strategies include paying a third party
insurer to assume risk. To modify the preceding examples, suppose
that 100 risk averse people each face a 1 percent chance of losing
$1,000, which equals an expected loss of $10. But also suppose that
they have the choice, using insurance, to part with a certain $15
instead of facing that chance. A third party might be willing to
accept the $15 from each of those 100 people, grossing $1,500, in
exchange for accepting the risk of having to pay $1,000. If so, the
result is an insurance market with 100 insureds paying the insurer
to take each of their risks.
II. EXISTING INSURANCE FOR AUDIT FAILURE
Auditors and investors typically handle risk of legal liability in
much the same way that others address kindred risks: by monitor-
ing risk to control it, thereby limiting probability and magnitude,
and by using insurance to distribute the residual risk. This Part
discusses two classes of tactics that auditors have long used to deal
with the residual risk by distributing it: third-party insurance and
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self-insurance. It tentatively concludes that self-insurance is
comparatively superior to third-party insurance in promoting audit
effectiveness.
A. Errors & Omissions (E&O) Insurance
Auditors have long used insurance to transfer and distribute
risk of legal liability arising from audit failure. The insurance is
variously dubbed professional liability insurance, malpractice
insurance or, most broadly, errors and omissions (E&O) insurance.
Such insurance is accompanied by two general limitations-moral
hazard and adverse selection-plus several limitations that raise
issues of peculiar significance to the audit function concerning
monitoring.
1. Moral Hazard
As to moral hazard, insureds who completely eliminate their risk
for a price have lesser incentive to limit probability or magnitude
than those who do not.7" The result is that insurance can perversely
increase both. A theoretically appealing response to this problem
is for insurers to monitor insureds and adjust premiums according
to steps that each insured takes to minimize probability and
magnitude of risk." Ideally, premiums would then be matched
precisely to risks.7" Alas, when pooling risks, monitoring each
insured is costly and sometimes impossible.79 The second-best
strategy emerges of incomplete risk elimination-that is, having the
insured retain some risk. ° Risk retention devices in insurance
include deductibles, co-insurance, and self-insured retentions.8 1
To appreciate how retentions function, first note that E&O
insurance is written with limits-of-liability, meaning an express
contractual limitation on the insurer's responsibility to pay under





81. Under a deductible, the insured bears any loss up to a stated amount; under co-
insurance, the insured bears a stated percentage of any loss regardless of amount.
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a policy." Traditional policies use a single amount to establish
both coverage per claim and aggregate limits-that is, the aggregate
policy amount that is available to cover any one claim. This is
satisfactory for most small and medium-sized auditing firms which,
on average, face one claim per year for every one hundred profes-
sionals employed.83 Larger firms face more frequent annual claims,
and related policies accordingly separately state limits per claim on
the one hand, and aggregate limits on the other.84
Virtually all E&O policies, with the exception of some for small
firms, use deductibles or self-insured retentions.85 Deductibles
require insureds to cover losses up to a stated amount before the
insurer is obligated to contribute; self-insured retentions require
insureds to cover losses before the insurer is obligated to pay
the full amount of the limits-of-liability.86 Deductibles, which are
less favorable to insureds, are more common in traditional E&O
insurance for smaller firms, while larger firms tend to obtain
policies using the more favorable self-insured retention terms.8 7
In the audit function, moral hazard can cut multiple ways. For
example, expansive liability presents moral hazard to shareholders
ex ante. If shareholders know they will be able to successfully sue
an issuer's auditor to recover losses due to audit failure, they enter
the picture with fewer incentives to self-protect.88 This is a theoreti-
cal defense not only of the privity rule for auditor negligence as in
Ultramares,89 but also to support a case for limiting liability in other
ways-either doctrinally, such as through tort law's economic loss
doctrine, or by fiat using damages caps. With such public policies in
place, investors have increased incentives both to monitor issuers




86. To illustrate the difference, consider a policy with an aggregate limits-of-liability of
$2 million applicable to audit failure damages of $2.5 million. With a deductible of, say,
$100,000, the insured must cover the first $100,000 and the insurer the remaining $1.9
million of policy coverage (leaving a $500,000 uninsured shortfall and a total obligation of
$600,000). With a retention of, say, also $100,000, the insured must cover $100,000 of the
total loss, meaning the insurer pays the full $2 million limits-of-liability and the insured the
rest, for a total of $500,000. Id.
87. Id.
88. See Siliciano, supra note 57, at 1948 & n.101.
89. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1931).
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and their auditors, and to effectively self-insure through investment
portfolio diversification.9'
On the other hand, such doctrinal or fiat limitations pose a
different problem of moral hazard, increasing moral hazard among
auditors on an engagement who are aware that their loss exposure
is capped. One issue is whose behavior is more likely to be influ-
enced by such moral hazard. This hinges, in large part, on the
strength of other incentives that shareholders face to self-protect on
the one hand, and auditors have to avoid conduct leading to audit
failure on the other. My purpose is not to settle that issue, but to
observe how that variable in the audit function contributes a kind
of uniqueness compared to other tort liability and insurance
contexts.91
An additional complication concerns auditors' capacity to pass
insurance-related costs through to clients. Shifting financial risks
from auditors to insurers would not diminish deterrence so long as
auditors as a group suffered when one auditor failed. But group
suffering will not occur if auditors can pass insurance costs on to
their clients, and, in turn, the public.92 Cost-passing reduces the
deterrent effect of imposing the costs on auditors, although some
deterrence may remain from risk of harm to reputation. Expanding
auditor liability would not help much, either. Whether auditors can
pass costs through is uncertain, even though public enterprises
do not have any choice but to hire an auditor, and that choice is
limited. On the other hand, insisting that auditors retain some
90. See infra text accompanying note 222.
91. The auditing context is not sui generis, of course, as two examples suggest. First, it
is possible to conceive of the problem of auditor liability as a problem of legal error risk arising
from juries or judges awarding excessive damages. Cf. EWERT, EU STuDY, supra note 11, at
ch. 26 & annex 6 (evaluating various theoretical economic arguments in favor of auditor
liability caps that exist apart from the issue of availability and expense of insurance). But this
problem pervades the U.S. liability system and is certainly not unique to auditing. Absent a
comprehensive systemic solution, context-specific solutions should be sought. Second, one
might observe that purchasers of securities discount the purchase price to reflect the
probability of financial catastrophe from audit failure, among other risks. Yet this does not
distinguish the securities investor class from many others, including, for example, owners of
properties in areas prone to natural disaster, such as coastal areas, who also discount their
purchase price in light of catastrophic risks.
92. See Kent D. Syverud, On the Demand for Liability Insurance, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1629,
1644-49 (1994). But see Randall R. Bovbjerg, Liability and Liability Insurance, 72 TEX. L. REV.
1655, 1665-66 (1994).
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liability risk, through retentions, might incrementally frustrate
their cost-passing ability. It may be more convincing to defend high
audit fees by citing high insurance premiums than by citing losses
incurred on liability claims.
2. Adverse Selection
As to adverse selection, ideally, a premium should equal an
insurer's expected loss plus administrative costs and a fair profit.93
Yet it is rarely practical to calculate each insured's individual
expected loss perfectly.94 The best that can be done, at reasonable
cost, is systematic classification of each insured into groups with
similar probabilistic attributes. For example, in automobile insur-
ance, insureds may be classified according to a combination of
discrete attributes such as specific accident histories, called
"experience rated," and whether the vehicles they drive are
equipped with air bags or not, called "feature rated".95
Risk classification grouping implies that, within groups, individu-
als pose different risks while paying the same premium.96 As a
result, more applicants will seek classification in lower-risk/lower-
premium groups.97 Resulting groups will have in them more
relatively higher-risk than lower-risk people for that classification.98
Insurers respond to this adverse selection by estimating its effects
using increasingly refined models that enable adjusting the scope of
coverage and premium charged for each risk group classification.99
These exercises are limited, however, and when the costs of
increasing refinement are greater than the benefits, no further
refinement is made.
93. In the market imagined above, supra Part II.A. 1, the insurer's total expected loss is
$1,000, and with one hundred people, that means $10 each plus $5 for costs and profit.
94. See MACKAAY, supra note 70, at 177.
95. See Kenneth S. Abraham, Efficiency and Fairness in Insurance Risk Classification, 71
VA. L. REV. 403, 413-14 (1985).
96. See id. at 415-16.
97. See id.
98. See id.
99. See id. at 422-24.
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3. Monitoring
The monitoring-related limitations of using E&O insurance to
address audit failure risk are serious. First, auditor E&O insurance
addresses an audit firm's exposure using general policies for specific
time periods. They are not tailored to particular audit engagements
or associated risks of audit failure. Such coverage generality may
pose perverse incentive effects that prevent calibrating auditing
tasks to the risks of audit failure arising from particular engage-
ments.
Second, and more importantly, this method separates the risk
monitoring function from the risk distribution function. That is,
auditors are in control of their insured activities with little or no
oversight by insurers. Monitoring is a way to control risk, but when
risk monitoring is separated from risk distribution, moral hazard
increases.' °° The theoretical appeal of bundling monitoring and
distribution evaporates to a point at which even second-best
strategies of retentions are impaired.
Put differently, the issue raises a problem of asymmetric
information when considering the various constituents in the audit
function. Relative access to information is greatest among issuers,
then auditors, and then the latter's external insurers. Issuers have
superior access to the basic financial data and are in the best
position to determine its reliability; auditors have superior knowl-
edge in determining their capability of assessing that information
and thus estimating the risk of audit failure. Insurers must rely
upon abstract models and command data sufficient to validly
estimate expected losses from audit failure.
Exposure from audit failure is more difficult for insurers to eval-
uate, as it involves matters of investor demographics. Estimating
the magnitude of audit failure is more uncertain when gauging the
scope of claims is difficult. This can occur due to limited information
about the number, identity, or type of third-party shareholders or
other investors who may assert claims. Such informational asymme-
try can lead insurers to increase premiums or retentions, limit
coverage, or add exclusions. When asymmetry is acute, premium
surges may occur, which increase the adverse selection that leads
100. See MACKAAY, supra note 70, at 179-80.
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to lower-risk insureds withdrawing from pools. With only high-risk
insureds left, pools unravel; self-insurance becomes the preferred
route for the low-risk insureds, and insurance for the high-risk
evaporates.
Consider an analogy from directors' and officers' (D&O) insur-
ance. Premiums and coverage may provide clues about liability risk
to the extent that they are valid proxies for corporate governance
quality.'' Yet scholars observe that D&O insurers do not appear to
have or act upon any monitoring incentives. 02 Although similar
data on E&O insurance does not appear to have been published, it
is reasonable to suppose a similar phenomenon in this line.
10 3
4. Insurance Levers
As with all insurance products, the market for E&O insurance
changes dynamically in response to prevailing macroeconomic and
social conditions that have specific effects on insurance underwrit-
ing decisions. These factors influence the supply and price -the
premium-of insurance available, and are characteristically used to
describe aspects of the familiar "cycle explanation" for insurance
market dynamics. Thus, the thumbnail sketch of such cyclicality
provided earlier can be explored more fully by considering underly-
ing components of statistical independence, adverse selection, and
moral hazard, as well as the bearing of monitoring capabilities on
101. Compare Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, Predicting Corporate Governance Risk:
Evidence from the Directors' & Officers' Insurance Market, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 487, 489-90
(2007), with Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: A
Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1, 54 & n.337 (2002) (arguing that
premiums for D&O insurance accurately reflect governance quality (citing John E. Core, The
Directors'and Officers'Insurance Premium: An Outside Assessment of the Quality of Corporate
Governance, 16 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 449 (2000))).
102. See Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, The Missing Monitor in Corporate Governance: The
Directors'& Officers' Liability Insurer, 95 GEO. L.J. 1795, 1807-08 (2007); see also Joseph A.
Grundfest, Punctuated Equilibria in the Evolution of United States Securities Regulation, 8
STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 1, 7-8 (2002) (invoking this basis to question Professor Ronen's
proposal, discussed infra in Part III.A of this Article, favoring financial statement insurance).
103. A policy parallel appears: Commentators who lament unavailability of auditor E&O
insurance and/or rising liability risks dramatize their arguments by warning that the
combination may drive auditors out of the auditing business with calamitous effects, while
those lamenting the unavailability of D&O insurance amid rising liability risks do so by
warning that the result may discourage talented and capable persons from serving on
corporate boards of directors.
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the latter.' In particular, consider a few examples of how
retentions can be used to address each of these three components.
First, retentions enable insurers to neutralize correlations among
risks that otherwise impair insurance's efficacy to pool and distrib-
ute them, that is, to address reduced independence of risks. That is,
if all pool members are certain to suffer losses of a given amount,
say $100,000 per year, then there is no independence as to that
amount, so it is not susceptible to risk-pooling and distribution.
Hence, deductibles rise to that level of uniformly certain loss.
Likewise, if all pool members are equally as likely to suffer losses in
a given category-say, from secondary debt offerings of highly-
leveraged enterprises-then the low independence of that pool
would increase the appeal of internal retentions compared to
external coverage.
Second, retentions address adverse selection by enabling insurers
to distribute total risk more heavily to high-risk than to low-risk
insureds. This is because uniformly high retentions for members of
a pool have the effect of charging more losses to those pool members
that suffer claims more often or in higher amounts than other pool
members. High retentions are thus better than higher premiums for
low-risk insureds. Their existence may suggest a strategy for
redressing high-risk variability in a pool and an effort, in response
to external macro forces, to keep insurance "available."
Third, retentions, as noted, reduce moral hazard. In part, this
arises from how they increase incentives for internal monitoring.
Indeed, high retentions may reflect that firms, rather than external
insurers, are better able to monitor, evaluate, and control associated
risks. But the second-best strategy of replacing monitoring with
retentions becomes even less effective the more unbundled the risk
monitoring and risk distribution functions become. This insight
contributes a partial explanation for why large auditing firms
initiated more ambitious self-insurance programs.
After all, volatility in E&O insurance markets also reflects the
competitive forces prevalent in most insurance markets, which are
financial in character and therefore pose few structural limitations
to industry expansion." 5 Insurers face competition not only from
104. See supra Part I.B.3.
105. See Romano, supra note 66, at 18 (noting that capacity constraints or withdrawals are
744 [Vol. 49:711
SECURITIZING AUDIT FAILURE RISK
other insurers but from their customers and potential customers.
Customers who regularly negotiate with insurers over retentions
increasingly appreciate the need to develop formal strategies to
manage and fund related risks: Customer responses vary according
to different risk classification groups. Among auditing firms,
these classifications parallel firm size: large, mezzanine, or small.
In recent decades, periods labeled "insurance crises" led the large
firms to pursue more systematic programs of self-insurance.
B. Self-insurance Programs (SIPs)
Hard insurance markets, and perhaps other factors, lead insureds
to strategy options other than transferring risk, often called self-
insurance. This is a colloquial term that actually designates a
complex variety of tools. In general, however, self-insurance involves
setting aside a portion of revenues from activity to meet losses
should they occur-a strategy that became increasingly common
throughout the U.S. economy in the late 1970s and early 1980s. °6
Of course, risk-retention devices prevalent in general insurance
contracts, such as deductibles and co-insurance, are a partial form
of self-insurance. What distinguishes the strategy usually described
as self-insurance is a more comprehensive program of reserving
funds to pay losses, more fully internalizing those risks.
1°7
puzzles in a competitive insurance market where premiums should adjust to changing
conditions, but noting how, for professional liability insurance, "desired terms of
coverage-and for some firms any coverage-became unavailable, at apparently any price");
see also id. (noting that the capacity constraint story is hard to believe "[gliven that the input
for insurance is wealth and not the physical capital of a factory which could have productive
capacity limits").
106. See Priest, supra note 65, at 1005 (documenting that "the extent of corporate self-
insurance has increased substantially over time through the creation of firm or industry
captive insurance subsidiaries and industry-wide mutuals"); see also id. (noting that "the
corporate purchase of commercial liability insurance has proven something of a puzzle
because corporations have many potential methods of diversifying to reduce the effect of
potential losses").
107. More precise vocabulary distinguishes among self-insurance, self-funding-which, in
turn, assumes the various forms of retentions such as deductibles and co-insurance, and no
insurance.
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1. Large Firm Programs
It is a commonly stated, although stylized, fact that large audit
firms have embarked on comprehensive self-insurance programs
(SIPs) using their own separately organized insurance affiliates.'
Note, however, that public details of such programs are scarce, as
the audit firms are privately held and do not produce the kinds of
disclosure that public enterprises do. Subject to this opacity, it is
possible to assemble a composite sketch of important outlines,
including operational and organizational scale, parameters of the
programs, and the types of reinsurance involved.
As to operational and organizational scale, consider, as a
representative firm, Deloitte (formerly called Deloitte Touche
Tohmatsu). It is actually a network of some seventy different
member firms organized in numerous jurisdictions of the world and
operating in nearly 140 different countries.0 9 As a whole, Deloitte
claimed total worldwide revenues of more than $20 billion in 2006
and reported commanding total assets of $10 billion, with total
liabilities plus partner capital of $6.4 billion.110 Deloitte's public
materials-and its internal training programs-emphasize quality
control throughout the organization and place a premium on
108. See Talley, supra note 11, at 1643 (noting "the stylized fact that, at least since the
savings and loan crises of the late 1980s, auditing firms have been effectively self-insured,
often through 'captive' (i.e., wholly-owned) insurance companies"); see also Goldwasser et al.,
AccouNTANTs' LIABILITY, supra note 61 (noting that 'large [auditing] firms since the mid
1980s have been unable to purchase sufficient liability insurance to satisfy their needs").
109. See About Deloitte, http://www.deloitte.com (follow "About Deloitte" hyperlink) (last
visited Nov. 23, 2007).
110. DELOMI"E, THE JOURNEY 50-52 (2006), available at http://www.deloitte.comidtt/
cdafdoc/contentdtt_- 2006arfinal101606.pdf [hereinafter THE JOURNEY]. Note that these
publicly reported figures do not balance and that Deloitte's public reports offer no explanation.
Perhaps the $3.6 billion difference between total assets of $10 billion and total liabilities plus
partner capital of $6.4 billion produces a functional insurance reserve. Whether formally or
even informally so denominated on the firm's private financial statements, some portion of
the difference could be available to meet liability arising from audit failure. The full amount,
$3.6 billion, is considerably larger than Professor Talley's "plausible range" of large firm
viability thresholds estimated at between $454 million and $2.15 billion. See Talley, supra
note 11, at 1679. Separately, of the reported total assets, accounts receivable appeared to be
the largest portion at $4.8 billion, with total current assets of $7.8 billion and total current
liabilities of $3.6 billion. THE JOURNEY, supra, at 52.
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maintaining uniform standards across those firms, evidently to
promote a sense of single-firm identity within the network.11'
The U.S. member firm of Deloitte is Deloitte USA. It provides
audit, tax, consulting, and financial advisory services through three
main subsidiaries: Deloitte & Touche LLP, Deloitte Tax LLP, and
Deloitte Consulting LLP." 2 Deloitte USA contributed almost $10
billion of the Deloitte annual worldwide revenue in fiscal year 2007
and employed 40,998 people, of whom 2,758 were partners; 32,438
were professional staff; 8,515 were administrative staff; and 8,108
were CPAs." 3 Deloitte USA operates through 101 U.S. offices in 92
cities. 1
4
The other three large auditing firms present themselves in
roughly similar, and similarly vague, ways. 1 5 All are networks
composed of scores of separate member firms; all boast in the range
of 100,000 employees; all generate annual revenue approaching $20
billion; and all derive revenue from three service categories: audit,
tax, and consulting/advisory. For each firm, about half the total
revenues are from audit and assurance, and the other half are from
other activities. Some variation appears in breakdowns of their
respective service lines and by geographic regions of the world as
well as by industry specialization. Importantly, all four firms
emphasize trans-network quality control and uniformity as part of
each firm's investments in both human capital and firm brand
identity.
111. See, e.g., THE JOURNEY, supra note 110.
112. Deloitte Facts & Figures, http://www.deloitte.com (follow "Press" hyperlink; then
follow "Facts & Figures" hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 23, 2007).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. As examples, PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC) describes itself as composed of many
different firms, some large and some small. It provides audit as well as non-audit and
transactional services. PWC's total worldwide revenues for fiscal year 2007 were $25.2 billion.
See PricewaterhouseCoopers Fact Sheet, http://www.pwc.com (follow "Press Room" hyperlink;
then follow "Fact Sheet" hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 23, 2007). Likewise, KPMG describes
itself as a "global network of professional service firms providing audit, tax and advisory
services." Press Release, KPMG, KPMG Firms' Combined Global Revenues Rise to US $16.9
Billion (Nov. 3, 2006), http://www.kpmg.com/Press/11.30.06.htm (last visited Nov. 23, 2007).
It has a large number of "member firms" which together employ 113,000 people worldwide,
with 6,800 partners and operations in 148 countries. Id. It has one member firm in China and
one member firm in the United States. Id. Total member revenues for 2006 were $16.9 billion,
and for 2005, $15.7 billion. KPMG, INTERNATIONAL ANNUAL REVIEW 2006, at 55, available at
http://www.kpmg.com/About/IAR2006.
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As to the nature of the firms' SIPs, again while the firms provide
scant public details concerning them, the various alternative meth-
ods of self-insurance are well recognized. Consider two: the captive
form and the mutual form. In the captive form, an enterprise
creates a wholly-owned affiliate-domestic or, more frequently,
offshore-and contributes requisite capital. The enterprise -and its
designated component members, such as firms within a net-
work-pay periodic premiums to support network-wide coverage.
The captive sometimes is managed using a separate management
company rather than the larger enterprise's own staff. Various
attributes can be created, but in general the captive thus acts as the
enterprise's primary insurer and usually, in turn, obtains reinsur-
ance policies to cover portions of its exposure.'
16
In the mutual form-commonly used among industrial enter-
prises in given industries-members coordinate to form what are
commonly called risk-retention pools." 7 Participants contribute
premiums to the mutual and it, in turn, covers member losses on
prescribed terms. The program often is designed using retrospec-
tively rated policies, meaning that each member pays premiums
initially for agreed coverage, but the premiums are later adjusted
based on actual loss experience."' If the member enjoys a favorable
loss experience, a portion of its initial premium is rebated, but if
it suffers an unfavorable loss experience, it pays an additional
premium surcharge.
A SIP's structure may be influenced by tax considerations. To the
extent that an enterprise allocates revenues to cover future legal
116. A captive insurance affiliate can (1) use reinsurance or not and (2) insure only internal
risks or also insure external risks. Those not using reinsurance and covering only internal
risks are in the same position as the simple residual self-insurance created under policies
containing retentions-that is, the parent, or network, does not transfer any risk. Those using
reinsurance and covering only internal risks do transfer risk, so long as the reinsurance is
with reputable, liquid, solvent insurers and the premium is fixed. See David R. Coburn &
Stewart J. Kahn, Accounting and Auditing Aspects of Operating a Captive or Self-Insurance
Program, in TECHNIQUES OF SELF-INSURANCE 499, 501-03 (PLI 1987).
117. Examples of mutuals include Lumbermen's Mutual, Millers Mutual, and Hardware
Mutual.
118. According to Professor Priest, "mutuals typically provide for subsequent assessments
against firm members based upon the liability experience of the mutual for the year." Priest,
supra note 65, at 1007. That is, "mutuals set premiums by making assessments to member
firms after, rather than before, the loss experience, thus insuring for variations in loss among
the firms, but providing self-insurance for losses common to mutual members." Id. at 1012-13.
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liabilities in ways that impose substantial limitations or restric-
tions on access to the funds, they are not includible in U.S. taxable
income." 9 The exact requirements of this tax treatment are
intricate2 ° and controversial as a policy matter, 2' but when
properly designed, the benefits of self-insurance can make it at least
as appealing as paying regular premiums to an external insurer,
certainly at the level of periodic costs. Using separately organized
network affiliates, whether captives or mutuals, can be a good way
to establish the requisite restrictions on use of funds.
As to the terms of reinsurance that the four large auditing firms'
SIP affiliates obtain, once again, the firms provide little disclosure
concerning these matters. But it appears that these affiliates all
obtain reinsurance for portions of network-wide exposure. These
reinsurance programs probably vary slightly across the four firms,
especially as to amounts, but again a fairly standardized picture
emerges. In general, the reinsurance policies resemble E&O policies
in form, but appear to be more intricate in the following ways.
First, the policies contain high retentions.'22 The levels fluctuate
over time, usually in tandem with insurance pricing. For example,
retentions ran to $25 million in the early 1990s and then grew to
$45 million in the mid- 1990s; they dropped to $20 million by the end
of that decade before rising again in the 2000s.
123
Second, the policies are obtained from multiple insurers covering
portions of different layers of exposure and use high limits-of-
liability coverage. 24 As an example, a firm's SIP reinsurance may
provide "coverage for 85 percent of the layer covering $10 million in
excess of $50 million, 90 percent of a layer covering $20 million in
119. See Dan L. Mendelson & Burton M. Mirsky, Malpractice Self-Insurance Plan Defers
Income, 76 J. TAX'N 16, 16-17 (1992) (reporting on IRS Letter Ruling 91-36-005 that fees
deferred under medical malpractice self-insurance arrangement are excludable from gross
income until paid or made available because they are subject to substantial limitations or
restrictions, including that the firm only received them to pay claims on dissolution or at a
fixed date ten years later; also noting that the ruling likewise applies to other professionals,
including accountants).
120. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 91-36-005 (Sept. 11, 1991) (interpreting Treas. Reg. § 1.451-
2).
121. See, e.g., Karen Gantt, Federal Tax Treatment of Medical Malpractice Insurance
Alternatives for Nonprofits, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 495 (2004).




WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
excess of $60 million, and 80 percent of the layer covering $20
million in excess of $75 million.' 25
Third, while most insurance policies, including E&O insurance,
are written using standard forms with extensive boilerplate clauses
and minimal negotiation or tailoring, policies for the four large
auditing firms' SIP affiliates are negotiated and tailored; they are
usually issued in typewritten form, containing non-standard terms,
and commonly described as "manuscript policies."'26
Finally, a related alternative is to use insurers not as a means to
pool and distribute risk as traditional insurance does, but as a
funding source to meet losses.'27 Audit firm SIP affiliates appear to
execute financing agreements with their reinsurers. These provide
that the latter will fund losses on designated terms but require the
firm to repay those funds in full.
21
2. Decisions To Self-insure
A decision to self-insure or use external insurance with some self-
funding can be influenced by many factors, but ultimately must be
based on a comparative cost-benefit analysis.' 29 The threshold
element in the decision is whether the risk is calculable. 3 ° An
important requirement is that an enterprise operates using a
sufficient population of "homogenous exposure units ... to allow an
actuarially sound calculation of risk."'3 ' For auditing firms, such
units could include, for example, total personnel, total professional
personnel, or total audit engagements.
125. Id. For example, assuming a $100 million covered loss, the firm pays a total of $57.5
million and insurers pay $42.5 million: [.85 (60 - 50)] + [.90 (80 - 60)] + [.80 (95 -75)] = 8.5 +
18 + 16 = $42.5. Assuming no other external coverage, for settlements greater than that, the
firm pays 100 percent of the excess.
126. Id. Manuscript policies are not common in primary insurance underwriting, but are
more the norm in reinsurance underwriting, in which the term "facultative" is also used
(referring to the reinsurer's "faculty" to accept or deny risks), and in the programs that
reinsurers use to reinsure their exposure, in which the term "recessory" is also used.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. See Ken Brownlee, Defending the 'Self-Insured' or 'Self-Funded' Entity, INS. LITIG.
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So armed, the comparative set of costs are principally the costs
of obtaining insurance, chiefly premiums-which, in turn, comprise
insurer costs, surpluses, and profits-plus brokers' or agents'
commissions, versus administrative costs of a program such as
operations and maintenance, claims handling, and litigation.'32
Quantifying the comparison in abstract terms is impossible because
too many variables are involved.'33 Indeed, comparative benefits are
difficult even to state, as they range from internal loss control
capability and claims administration efficiency to external dynamics
of litigation and the power to manage it.134
Nevertheless, simply viewing the question from a comparative
cost-benefit perspective suggests that characterizations such as
whether a risk is "insurable" or "uninsurable" can be imprecise. 3 '
For example, it may be superficial to say that self-insurance arose
among the four large auditing firms because insurers regard the
risk as "too high" or "too unpredictable." It can likewise appear
facile to opine that such conclusions are due to expansion of legal
liability that auditors face. 3 ' Indeed, that claim is somewhat
counterfactual in the current period, given how the PSLRA, SLUSA,
and Central Bank all reduced such exposure and how empirical data
show a decline in the frequency of suits against auditors. "'
True, as noted, factors that affect the comparative cost-benefit
analysis vary with the circumstances creating hard external in-
surance markets, which can include both legal uncertainty and legal
liability risks.13 Yet those circumstances of the macro environment
are influenced more fundamentally by micro factors, and these
provide a more concrete analytical basis for exploring the compara-
tive calculus than conclusions about whether risks are insurable.
The question is whether it is more efficient or cost-effective for a
party to obtain external insurance or create self-insurance. 13 The




135. See Priest, supra note 65, at 1011.
136. See id. at 1001.
137. See supra text accompanying notes 26-34.
138. See Brownlee, supra note 129.
139. See Priest, supra note 65, at 1010-11 (making this point and furnishing the analytical
architecture upon which the following evaluations are based).
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better positioned to monitor and distribute the risk. 4' Because firms
and insurers have some capacity to diversify risks, the issue is
ultimately which has the superior ability to do so. That hinges, in
turn and in general, on risk independence, adverse selection, moral
hazard, and monitoring capability.141 Consider each point.
As to risk independence, for insurance to be appealingly priced,
risks that insureds within a pool face cannot be too highly corre-
lated.142 There must be sufficient statistical independence for an
insurer to make valid predictions that the aggregate premium and
investment income from the pool will be enough to fund reserves to
meet loss payouts, including covering administrative costs and
providing a profit. 43 If requisite insurer reserves equal or exceed
those that a self-insuring firm would require, it is more effective for
a firm to self-insure.
44
If the four large auditing firms operate SIPs akin to the mutual
form used by industrial enterprises, this could reflect decreased
risk independence over time, which may be due to many factors
including legal liability or increased uniformity in audit quality
achieved by increasing homogeneity among the large firms.'
45
Mutual insurance may be better than external insurers at furnish-
ing coverage for any loss category in which there is substantial
correlation among members. 46 The external insurer's solution to the
challenge would be to offer coverage for some group losses, but with
exclusions for the highly correlated type.147 Yet, defining the highly
correlated type contractually can be difficult; this difficulty may
make external insurers a less effective discriminator compared to
the mutual approach, which can enable members to pool individual
member risks of all sorts while also covering all group losses.
41
As to adverse selection, it can be exacerbated when there is an
acutely wide disparity of risk profiles in a single insurance pool.
149
140. Id.
141. See id. at 1011, 1034; see also Talley, supra note 11, at 1644.
142. See Priest, supra note 65, at 1011.
143. See id. at 1012, 1099.
144. Id. at 1011.
145. See id. at 1012.
146. Id. at 1012-13.
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At an extreme, no insurer can sustain such pools and too few low-
risk insureds will remain in them; thus, the pool can unravel and
the market for that insurance disappear. 5 ° To say that the risk is
"uninsurable," however, remains imprecise. 5' It means that
insureds who are otherwise candidates for that pool will not
participate in it because they are better off meeting the risk by other
means. Of course, the word "uninsurable" may be apt to the extent
that the absence of low-risk insureds means that insurers will not
make the insurance available to high-risk insureds.
Acute adverse selection arising from highly disparate risks means
that there is so much variation among pool members or candidates
that insurers cannot effectively segregate low-risk from high-risk
members and thus offer equivalent insurance terms as to premiums,
retentions, and exclusions/coverage (limits-of-liability). When that
occurs, lower-risk members will not participate because what they
pay and receive is worth less than the risk that they would contrib-
ute to the pool.'52 At the extreme, that could mean that the particu-
lar insurance product is unavailable to anyone and, to that extent,
the related risks may be described as "uninsurable."'53
As to moral hazard and monitoring, self-insurance bundles risk
monitoring and risk distribution functions, as noted.' Whereas
E&O insurance separates risk monitoring from risk distribution,
self-insurance combines the two. Risk-monitoring is performed by
the same enterprise that distributes the risk. Within the networks
that constitute each of the four large auditing firms, members may
eliminate the costs of moral hazard and adverse selection. At a
minimum, the network character of the firms enables internal
monitoring in ways that external insurers cannot replicate.155 This
appears particularly likely given that each of the four large firms
devotes considerable resources to promoting uniform internal
quality control programs.'56
150. Id. at 1011.
151. See id.
152. Id. at 1028.
153. Id. at 1011.
154. See supra Introduction.
155. See Talley, supra note 11, at 1659.
156. Id. at 1658-60.
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All or some combination of the foregoing factors likely have
played some role in the decisions that the four large auditing firms
have made to engage in substantial self-insurance programs. 157 No
firm would have opted for a self-insurance program unless it had
determined that the costs of supporting it are less than the premi-
ums and commissions required to buy equivalent external insur-
ance.15 This determination is based on a firm's knowledge or belief
that the risk it would otherwise contribute to an external insurance
pool, for a given price, is less than the risk that an insurer would
estimate that the firm contributes (the price should be lower). The
self-insuring firm determines, in other words, that bearing the risk
is more cost-effective than paying the price an external insurer
charges to pool that risk for it.
Two additional factors may help to explain the rise and persis-
tence of SIPs among the four large auditing firms, as well as why
the medium and smaller firms have not tended to opt for such
ambitious programs. The first is a path dependence story. Once
induced to adopt SIPs due to macro events plus the scale that makes
them possible, it may be more cost-effective to sustain the formal
program permanently than to allow it to fluctuate according to the
relative supply and pricing of E&O insurance.
The second is a wealth story. Risk aversion can vary with the net
worth of a decision maker, with those having fewer resources being
more risk averse and those commanding considerable resources
being less risk averse.'59 It is possible that smaller public accounting
firms are more risk averse than the four large firms. If so, this also
would explain why they show a stronger appetite for self-insurance
compared to smaller firms. Put differently, the larger firms may be
more willing to take chances than smaller ones. 6 °
157. See Romano, supra note 66, at 27 (discussing directors' and officers' insurance and
noting that issuers are "often better informed about [novel litigation] risks and some of these
risks are within the insured's control. This situation may be one of the reasons for the rise in
policyholder-formed insurers: the adverse selection and moral hazard problems created by the
information asymmetry between insured and insurer will obviously be remedied if the insured
becomes the insurer. It is plausible, in this context, to anticipate that policyholder-formed
insurance groups could screen members more effectively than commercial insurers.").
158. See Priest, supra note 65, at 1010-11.
159. See supra Part I.C.5.
160. Yet another possibility is firms' relative ability to pass insurance-related costs to
clients, but it is difficult to see how the costs of external versus internal insurance would be
easier or harder to transfer that way.
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This analysis does not negate the possibility that expanded legal
liability may explain the rise of SIPs among the four large auditing
firms, or that legal uncertainty and associated catastrophic risk
may continue to play a role in their continued use. 6 ' Indeed, this
is a common theory explaining the rise of self-insurance programs
throughout the U.S. economy in recent decades. 162 For example,
for corporations generally, expanded tort liability increases risk
variability by shifting the burden of losses from first to third parties
-that is, from violators to insurers-thus encouraging adverse
selection, meaning high-risk insureds seek out pools containing low-
risk insureds. 6' It also reduces risk independence because tort-
expanding laws are or can be systemic rather than discrete, putting
all pool members or candidates at increasingly uniform levels of
risk. 164
This account appears to be plausible for many industries
generally, and possibly for auditing in particular. Consider, for
example, the empirical frequency and magnitude of securities fraud
class action claims against auditing firms. 6 ' Their statistical
distribution exhibits greater density in the right tail than under a
normal distribution, meaning that there are a larger number of
larger risks.'66 Such fat-tail distributions present an exception to
basic principles of risk distribution through diversification that
support establishing insurance pools.1 67 Although basic theory
prescribes diversifying risk away by adding to a portfolio, for fat-tail
distributions the opposite obtains (not to diversify) as each addi-
tional investment increases risk.'68 If this occurs in the large audit
161. See supra text accompanying notes 132-34.
162. See Priest, supra note 65, at 1013 (attributing variability increase and independence
decrease to the "obvious explanation" that "[in the mid-1960s, courts began to expand tort
liability for corporate activities, both by extending affirmative duties and restricting available
defenses").
163. See id.
164. See Romano, supra note 66, at 15 (explaining that if all insureds are equally affected
by new developments, including uncertainties arising from legal change, "the increased
liability risks will not be independent. A dependency in insureds' losses disrupts insurance
markets because the law of large numbers will no longer apply for pricing risks, so that
premiums will be greater than expected losses.").
165. See Talley, supra note 11, at 1644.
166. See id. at 1645-46.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 1645.
2007)
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
firm insurance market, it could explain insurer reluctance to
provide E&O insurance and the rise of SIPs among large auditing
firms.
Yet this general critique as applied to auditing may insufficiently
account for matters of adverse selection, moral hazard, and
monitoring in the audit function.169 Consider alternative interpreta-
tions of the data that do so. Moral hazard and adverse selection can
lead to premiums greater than insureds are willing to pay. 170 That
is, an insurer may determine, under adverse selection, that policies
would underwrite industry "lemons."'' That could lead them to
price policies so high that the non-lemon insureds opt out of the
pool. The non-lemons are those insureds capable and willing to
engage in sufficient risk monitoring on their own to reduce the
probability of loss, and its magnitude should it occur.
Among the large auditing firms, this would mean that they have
simply become the lower cost avoider compared to external
insurers."' Accordingly, while liability and catastrophic risk may
partially explain the rise of SIPs and decline of attractively priced
E&O insurance, these basic components of insurance analysis-and
the effects of scale that the SIP affiliates command-contribute at
least equally important explanations. 173
This tentative conclusion is reinforced by an analytical view of the
strategies available to insurers seeking to provide insurance at
prices that customers find appealing. In theory, the premium on
every insurance pool should be measured according to the pool's
169. It also may discount the significance of investment diversification that investors can
pursue. See Romano, supra note 66, at 15 (citing Ralph K. Winter, "Crises" in Competitive
Insurance Markets 4 (Hoover Inst. of Stanford Univ., Working Paper No. E-86-74, 1986)
(stating that "dependent risks, that is, nondiversifiability in the insurance market, should not
matter in a stock market economy because insurers could diversify those risks in the capital
market")).
170. See Romano, supra note 66, at 27.
171. See Talley, supra note 11, at 1645.
172. See id. at 1646. In this view, auditors can "more efficiently internalize agency costs
[that is, costs of both adverse selection and moral hazard] by self-insuring." Id. They also can
address their overall risk profile because they have "the ability to raise fees in the face of
litigation risk [and this] permits auditing firms to engage in a form of effective self-insurance,
extracting actuarial payments that reflect downstream liability risk." Id. at 1688.
173. See id. at 1690 ("While [catastrophic] risk exposure may well be playing a partial role,
it is plausible that scale economies and agency costs also help explain the absence of an
insurance market for dominant auditing firms.").
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average risk.' If so, the pool premium will exceed the risk that low-
risk members contribute. When risk variability increases, that gap
increases and low-risk insureds pay even more than the risk they
contribute. Low-risk insureds are thus the marginal buyers, and
insurers compete to obtain their business. Competition may include
refining pool categories and channeling customers into lower-risk
pools with lower premiums or better terms, which insurers attempt
to do by more accurate risk segregation and discrimination methods.
To work, the strategy requires insurers' ability to conduct
sufficient monitoring of their customers. For that strategy to be cost
effective, in turn, the cost of refining the classifications must be less
than the gains from attracting targeted business. But high-risk
variability pools limit an insurer's ability to compete effectively in
this way and discourage low-risk customers from buying offered
policies. Monitoring is central to this exercise, which supports the
view that the capacity of SIPs to combine risk monitoring with risk
distribution renders them a potentially superior model of insuring
audit failure relative to E&O insurance. Although still not conclu-
sive, this alternative approach casts analytical doubt upon the
persuasiveness of insurance-based arguments favoring damages
caps on auditor liability. Even if the alternative is incorrect, it
seems premature to accept the damages caps argument without
considering potential models of insuring audit failure that are yet
untried.
III. POTENTIAL INSURANCE FOR AUDIT FAILURE
Although E&O insurance and self-insurance programs are the
extant models used to address liability for audit failure, two
alternatives deserve further exploration as a matter of public policy:
financial statement insurance and insurance-based securitization.
Previous proposals concerning financial statement insurance will be
summarized briefly below before presenting the novel alternative of
adapting insurance-based securitization to address catastrophic
audit failure risk.
174. See Priest, supra note 65, at 1027.
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A. Financial Statement Insurance (FSI)
Financial statement insurance (FSI) was introduced by New
York University accounting professor Joshua Ronen, 175 and I have
elaborated upon it in a series of articles.176 Although not yet in
place on a large scale for public companies, embryonic versions
of FSI are used in private market merger and acquisition (M&A)
transactions, and analogues are in use in other contexts. This
vehicle offers numerous attractions, including not only a way to
establish functional caps on auditor liability and address relatively
ordinary risks of audit failure, but also several other benefits, such
as increased transparency and monitoring as compared to existing
practice.
1. Structure
FSI's basic idea is simple. In M&A transactions, a seller repre-
sents that its financial statements fairly present financial conditions
and result in conformity with GAAP; an insurer then engages an
auditor to review the statements and backs the representation
with insurance. 7 7 Should the seller breach that representation-
equivalent to audit failure-the insured pays losses up to the
contractually agreed-upon amount.7 1
To put FSI to work on the broad scale necessary for public
companies and their auditors, several somewhat radical structural
175. Ronen, supra note 51, at 48-60.
176. See Cunningham, Choosing Gatekeepers, supra note 17; Lawrence A. Cunningham, A
Model Financial Statement Insurance Act, 11 CONN. INS. L.J. 69 (2004); Cunningham, Too Big
To Fail, supra note 13.
177. See DALE A. OESTERLE, THE LAW OF MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 289 (2d ed. 2002);
Darian M. Ibrahim, The Unique Benefits of Treating Personal Goodwill as Property in
Corporate Acquisitions, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 41-42 (2005).
178. Analogous insurance products are used to cover both tax opinions and ERISA
compliance, in each case involving a lawyer or other expert investigating and providing formal
opinions that are then backed by insurance. See Kenneth A. Gary, New Opportunity for Tax
Lawyers: Insuring Tax Transactions, 104 TAX NOTES 26 (2004) (discussing the proliferation
of tax insurance); Kyle D. Logue, Tax Law Uncertainty and the Role of Tax Insurance, 25 VA.
TAX REv. 339 (2005) (discussing tax insurance in context of characteristics of tax code);
Jeffrey D. Mamorsky & Terry L. Moore, Greenberg Traurig LLP, Fiduciary Audit Insurance:
Risk Management for Post-Enron ERISA Compliance, GT ALERT, June 2002, at 4-5, available
at http://www.gtlaw.com/pub/alerts/2002/mamorskyj 06a.pdf(explaining the terms of an audit
as a condition to insurance eligibility).
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changes would need to occur. Rather than an issuer engaging an
auditor whose liability risks are backed by E&O insurance or self-
insurance, issuers buy insurance directly from an insurer. The
insurance policy covers a given set of financial statements in
exchange for a premium, which the insurer sets, in part, based on
a preliminary audit of the issuer using an auditor that the insurer
hires. A final audit is performed before the policy is issued, and
coverage is established for those financial statements. If losses
occur, the insurer pays covered losses in accordance with the policy's
limits of liability. Benefits of this structure include removing the
inherent conflict of interest that arises when issuers hire and pay
auditors to give opinions on their financial statements.
In addition to these changes to structural features, the proposed
FSI regime calls for issuers to disclose publicly the premiums
they are charged and the amount of related coverage they
obtain, including any details as to deductibles and exclusions. This
disclosure is designed to provide public information concerning
financial statement reliability. Investors and analysts would be able
to calculate statistically valid comparisons of relative financial
statement integrity among issuers. Thus in addition to eliminating
the conflict of interest embedded in the traditional audit function,
new transparency arises that is lacking in the current regime, in
which auditors issue identical three-paragraph opinions for the
financial statements of enterprises having vastly different, and
individually unique, accounting circumstances.
2. Advantages
Beyond these attractions of FSI compared to traditional practice,
FSI has implications for insurance analysis that reveal additional
advantages. FSI could potentially eliminate moral hazard. FSI
moves auditors into the liability background. Auditors become
insurer employees and are subject to supervision, compensation,
and termination. Auditors no longer face any insurance-based
decisions that are prone to creating moral hazard. FSI also essen-
tially eliminates the traditional concerns of adverse selection,
because it is an entirely different product compared to traditional
categories of insurance such as professional liability insurance,
casualty, or property insurance. Rather, among insurance products,
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FSI is akin to title insurance, an otherwise sui generis insurance
line.
Title insurance is coverage concerning risks of defects in legal
title to real property. 179 Home sellers represent ownership of title to
buyers and, when transferring their interest, provide buyers with
title insurance policies supporting the representation. If the seller
breaches the representation, the insurer defends the buyer's claim
of title against third parties and pays the buyer's damages arising
from the third party's successful assertion against the buyer's
title. 0 Title insurance has a retroactive character to the extent that
it covers matters arising before the policy issuance date.''
Analogously, FSI insures a particular year's financial statements,
with coverage extending to discoveries made in future periods. FSI
covers accounting irregularities reflected in financial statements of
a prior period. FSI and title insurance both solve a problem of
incomplete information: with title insurance, the quality of a seller's
title, and with FSI, the quality of a company's financial statements.
In contrast, E&O insurance is less about incomplete information
than about behavioral and performance risks. The costs of adverse
selection can be considerable in underwriting E&O insurance, but
the cost essentially disappears under FSI.
As to monitoring, FSI contributes superior results compared to
E&O insurance-and a different form of monitoring compared to
SIPs. Unlike most insurance lines, including E&O insurance, a
substantial portion of premiums received on title insurance policies
is used to fund investigation rather than payouts, administrative
costs, and profits.'82 Title insurers engage, and FSI insurers would
engage, in risk assessment using particularized investigations
concerning the specific attributes of an insured matter: property and
zoning records for title insurance and specific financial statements
for FSI.18 3
179. See JAMES L. GoSDIN, TITLE INSURANCE: A COMPREHENSIVE OVERVIEW 1 (2d ed. 2000).
180. See generally id.
181. See generally id. (noting additionally that title insurance can also include post-policy
matters).
182. See id. (noting that "a substantial part of title insurance cost generally [is] allocated
to search, evaluation/examination, or clearing underwriting objections," and that for title
insurance, losses and legal costs range as low as 3 percent to 7 percent of total operating
income).
183. Id. at 2.
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As a result, FSI amounts to a bundling of the monitoring and risk
distribution functions by insurers. Of course, SIPs likewise bundle
the two, although they bundle them inward within the audit firm or
network instead of outward to the insurer. In contrast, as noted,
E&O insurance separates the two functions. Consequently, E&O
insurance may not produce optimal insurer investigation.
FSI provides monitoring incentives on insurers that differ from
those insurers face when underwriting E&O insurance. E&O
policies provide general coverage for a broad range of activities,
including all audit engagements plus tax and other consulting
services. The same is essentially true for the SIPs that the large
auditing firms use. In contrast, each FSI is tailored to a particular
audit engagement with an associated risk, premium, and coverage.
Audit effectiveness and auditor performance bear directly on
financial statement and reporting quality. Under FSI, auditor
review and opinions are imminent monitoring functions-they are
the essence of the concept.
As noted, SIPs and FSI thus both bundle monitoring and risk
distribution, but into different locations. With SIPs, the monitoring
and risk functions are bundled within the audit firm (bundled in),
whereas with FSI the functions are bundled out to the insurer
(bundled out). Which is better is a function of which bundling more
nearly optimizes being least costly and most effective. This is an
empirical question for which no data exists, of course. An analytical
case could be made to favor one or the other, but such an assess-
ment is likely to produce a draw. That is, for the audit function, the
idea of bundling may likely be superior to separation, but there is
no a priori reason to conclude that the two are better bundled in or
bundled out.
Assuming a draw on the relative merits of bundling in or
bundling out, a case still may be made to favor one or the other for
separate reasons. The conservatism of SIPs is appealing-it is the
status quo and requires no changes, political or otherwise. FSI is
appealing because it: (1) severs the longstanding conflict of interest
that bedevils the audit function when issuers pay those who opine
on their financial statements, and (2) creates the unprecedented
production of a financial statement reliability index.
FSI could produce another advantage by using option markets as
functional reinsurance. Investors would write and sell put options
20071
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to FSI insurers respecting stock of covered companies.' Put options
would give insurers the right to sell covered stock to investors
during a stated period upon the occurrence of stated events at a
stated exercise price. Duration and triggering events would be
coextensive with the FSI policy period and triggering events.
Investors would sell the put options for a price less than the price of
general options on the same stock, that is, those whose exercise is
not conditional on audit failure, and that price would essentially
represent a reinsurance premium from the insurer's viewpoint.
Upon a triggering event, the stock price likely would fall below the
exercise price, enticing the insurer to exercise the option and
thereby establishing functional re-insurance. Investors writing
numerous put options on a large number of stocks enable designing
a diversified portfolio of FSI put options.
Another appealing factor is that the installation of the insurance
industry into the forefront of the financial reporting system
significantly increases the number of competitors in this market-
place. With SIPs, there are only four firms capable of auditing the
vast majority of public enterprises. This poses considerable systemic
risk should any audit failure threaten the viability of any one of
them, which, in turn, creates significant moral hazard among
auditors who may behave as if their firms are too big to fail. FSI has
comparative appeal because dozens of insurers are capable of
underwriting this risk.
This conclusion need not rule out the possibility of sustaining
SIPs, however. FSI and SIPs both could be used-they are not
mutually exclusive. Audit firms could continue operating SIPs but
also embark on an FSI regime by holding out their SIPs among
those FSI insurers competing for issuer audit insurance work. So,
for example, Procter & Gamble could hire Chubb Insurance to write
FSI for it, and Chubb could in turn hire Deloitte's auditing arm to
provide the investigation. Alternatively, Procter & Gamble could
hire Deloitte's SIP affiliate to write FSI and have it, in turn, engage
Deloitte's auditing arm to provide the assurance.8 5
184. See Ronen, supra note 51, at 54.
185. Inviting auditing firms to use their SIP affiliates to underwrite FSI raises a question
concerning whether this would mean that the firms thus engage in "the business of
insurance." If so, state insurance regulations could apply to limit the efficacy of this
alternative. On the other hand, a similar question could be raised concerning firms' existing
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Financial statement insurance can provide a mechanism to
establish the functional equivalent of a damages cap for audit
failure. The cap does not directly apply to auditors, of course, for
although they may face contractual and other liability for transgres-
sions to their insurer employers, they face no liability to investors.
The cap is established through the policy terms reached between
issuers and insurers. The cap would be disclosed to public capital
markets ex ante and enable investors to make capital allocation
decisions accordingly. Decisions would be based on measurable
resources available in the event of audit failure and the transparent
financial statement reliability index. To this extent, FSI furnishes
support for quotidian cases of audit failure, but perhaps not
catastrophic cases. Insurance-based securitization can address the
latter problem.
B. Insurance-based Securitization (IBS)
Insurance-based securitization is a novel innovation that
would distribute risk of audit failure through capital markets
and specifically addresses concerns about catastrophic risks.
Securitization refers to the practice of packaging some underlying
set of economic attributes, usually cash flows and related risks, into
securities. It is a decades-old practice that began when mortgage
lenders pooled loans that they had written into grantor trusts,
which then issued securities to the public backed by cash flows on
those loans and were subject to borrower default risk.
A proliferation of pooled assets ensued, encompassing automo-
bile and boat loans, credit card receivables, and projected cash
flows from computer leases and popular musical recording contracts.
In credit card deals, for example, a bank generates credit card
receivables and faces related consumer default risk while tying up
its cash. A securitization transfers the latter burdens by selling the
receivables to a grantor trust or other special purpose entity (SPE)
for cash supplied by investors. Investors, in turn, enjoy a return on
investment in accordance with that default risk-which, for portions
SIP programs and, in both SIPs and FSI, good arguments suggest that the auditing firm's role
should not be considered to be the business of insurance within the meaning of those
regulations.
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of the capital markets, increases financial diversification. By
isolating the assets in the SPE, moreover, investors look solely to
the credit risk of the pool, not to that of the originating bank.
The basic insight underlying asset-backed securities motivates
insurance-based securitization (IBS), although the two involve
different sides of the balance sheet. Whereas asset-backed securiti-
zation involves the transfer of assets to an SPE, insurance-based
securitization essentially involves the transfer of liabilities to an
SPE. That is, the SPE attracts investors who are willing to take a
risk that designated insured risks will materialize. This reduces or
eliminates the principal they are owed, in exchange for a relatively
high interest rate to compensate for that risk.
Since the mid-1990s, insurance-based securitization has be-
come increasingly used by insurers-and several non-insurance
businesses-to protect against exposure to catastrophic risks for
which traditional insurance, or reinsurance, is either unavailable or
comparatively expensive. Following this innovation, auditing firms
concerned about the catastrophic risk that a massive audit failure
could wreak, such as the dissolution of one of the four remaining
firms, should find insurance-based securitization attractive.
1. The Market
In the mid- 1990s, following the natural catastrophes of Hurricane
Andrew and the Northridge, California earthquake, insurance
capacity to cover catastrophic risks contracted significantly.'86 This
led innovators to adapt securitization to fill the gap.'87 Resulting
186. In August 1992, Hurricane Andrew struck south of Miami, Florida, resulting in
property damage of some $30 billion, of which half was insured. Insurers were riveted, with
eleven firms bankrupted. In January 1994, an earthquake rocked northwest of Los Angeles
in the Northridge area of the San Fernando Valley, also producing about $30 billion in
damages, of which nearly half was insured. Earthquake insurance availability declined
dramatically as a result. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CATASTROPHE INSURANCE RISKS: THE
ROLE OF RISK-LINKED SECURITIES AND FACTORS AFFECTING THEIR USE 11 (Sept. 2002) (citing
report by Swiss Reinsurance Company for 2000) [hereinafter, GAO, CATASTROPHE INSURANCE
RISKS].
187. Innovators include insurers as well as non-insurance businesses. Nothing about IBS
limits its creation to insurers or reinsurers. See id. at 18 n.25 ("A noninsurance business that
has catastrophe exposure can also sponsor catastrophe bonds through a similar entity, a
special purpose vehicle."). Indeed, as noted below, at least three IBS transactions have been
closed by non-insurance enterprises.
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products are sometimes collectively called "risk-linked securities."
The most common of these are called catastrophe bonds, nicknamed
cat bonds, 8' because the risks they address have historically been
called catastrophe risks or super catastrophic risks. These bonds are
for low-probability, high-magnitude events, commonly illustrated by
natural disasters like hurricanes, earthquakes, and tornadoes, but
also including man-made events such as terrorist attacks and
financial calamities.
189
In a basic "cat bond" deal structure, an investment bank or
insurance company creates an SPE. The SPE is usually located
offshore, mainly to avoid adverse U.S. income tax consequences. The
SPE issues bonds in a private placement to qualified institutional
investors. The bonds usually carry a floating interest rate with a
significant spread above the London Interbank Offered Rate
(LIBOR), the rate that large international banks charge each other
for sizable loans.
Cash flows into the SPE from three sources: insurance premiums
from the insurer or reinsurer, the principal investment of investors,
and investment income on its funds. The latter are usually fixed-
rate returns which are then swapped with a credit-worthy counter-
part who pays LIBOR-based floating rates for payment to investors.
Cash flows out of the SPE in the form of periodic interest to
investors, along with a return of principal at the end of its term.
During the term, the SPE holds funds in trust and invests them
in designated classes of securities, usually U.S. government bonds
or other high-grade securities. If the catastrophe does not occur, the
SPE returns principal to the investors and terminates its existence;
but if the catastrophe occurs, principal that otherwise would be paid
to investors is instead paid to the sponsor. It is conceptually-if not
188. The Chicago Board ofTrade (CBOT) experimented with catastrophe options in the late
1990s, the first systematic effort to market risk-linked securities. Introduced in 1995, the
contracts covered insurers' risk exposure based on various regional indexes. CBOT ceased
offering catastrophe options in 1999 due to weak demand for the products. See id. at 18.
189. Just as E&O and other insurance markets are cyclical, supra text accompanying notes
56-63, catastrophe reinsurance markets are cyclical, too. See GAO, CATASTROPHE INSURANCE
RISKS, supra note 186, at 14. In addition, occurrences in one catastrophic context, such as
hurricanes, can lead to contractions in other catastrophe markets. See Kenneth A. Froot &
Paul G. J. O'Connell, The Pricing of U.S. Catastrophe Reinsurance, in THE FINANCING OF
CATASTROPHE RISK 155-60 (Kenneth A. Froot ed., 1999).
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mechanically or technically-akin to the risk of corporate insolvency
that investors in traditional corporate bonds face.
The IBS market is young and thin, but has steadily expanded.
The first IBS transaction closed in 1995 and involved $84 million
of coverage; in 1998, 18 deals were closed, involving a total of $2.5
billion;19° from 1999 through 2004, some 50 additional transactions
were closed, most by insurers, averaging about $100 million each.191
In 1999, Oriental Land Company became the first non-insurer to
issue a catastrophe bond;' 92 in 2002, the Hollywood-based movie
company Vivendi International closed an IBS transaction with
coverage of up to $175 million for losses arising from earthquakes
in Southern California; 93 and in 2005, a group of oil companies
issued $405 million in IBS in three tranches to cover global risks of
liability arising from oil-related business activity. 194 Although most
estimates indicate that the IBS market is not inconsiderable,'95 it
remains a small share of the overall reinsurance market-less than
half of a percent, according to one estimate. 96
190. See Tamar Frankel & Joseph W. LaPlume, Securitizing Insurance Risks, 19 ANN. REV.
BANKING L. 203, 225 (2000) (citing Alex Maurice, NAIC Poised To Adopt Securitization
Models, NAT'L UNDERWRITER, PROP. & CASUALTY/RISK & BENEFITS MGMT. ED., July 12, 1999,
at S28); see also Investors Guar. Fund, Ltd. v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1523 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (discussing early history of IBS market); ROBERT H. JERRY, II,
UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW 1062 (3d ed. 2002) (noting that, through 2000, some $4
billion in insurance-based securities were issued).
191. See MMC SEC., THE GROWING APPETITE FOR CATASTROPHIC RISK: THE CATASTROPHIC
BOND MARKET AT YEAR-END 2004, at 32-35 (2005).
192. See Frankel & LaPlume, supra note 190, at 225 (citing J. David Cummins, The
Insurance Link to Securities, RISK MGMT., Aug. 1, 1999, at 17).
193. See MMC SEC., THE GROWING APPETITE FOR CATASTROPHIC RISK, supra note 191, at
34.
194. See MMC SEC., THE CATASTROPHE BOND MARKET AT YEAR-END 2006: RIPPLES INTO
WAVES, at 34 (2007) (listing transaction by Avalon Re Ltd. vehicle sponsored by Oil Casualty
Insurance Ltd.).
195. For an estimate that seems very high compared to others, see Martha G. Bannerman,
Avoiding and Resolving Reinsurance Coverage Disputes: A Proactive Approach, in PLI
REINSURANCE VOLUME 173, 203-04 (PLI 1998) (putting the IBS market in 1998 at $200
billion).
196. See GAO, CATASTROPHE INSURANCE RISKS, supra note 186, at 17 (discussing estimates
provided by Swiss Re and Goldman Sachs, which claim some $12 billion worth of IBS were
issued from 1996 to 2002 through about 70 transactions). For perspective, the size of the U.S.
capital markets in 2002 approximated $31 trillion. Id. For further perspective, at that time,
approximately $2 trillion in asset-backed securities were outstanding. Id. at 19 n.26.
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2. Structuring Challenges
Despite steady growth in the IBS market, several complexities
associated with many of the transactions-especially those initiated
by insurers-help to explain why it will take time for the market to
fully blossom. Although all these complexities have been overcome
for insurers wishing to sponsor deals, albeit slowly, they are
essentially either non-existent for auditing firms and their SIP
affiliates, or have been sufficiently plowed in previous transactions
so that the road is substantially paved for auditing firms to close
IBS transactions. It is especially helpful that Oriental Land
Company, Vivendi International, and the oil industry, all non-
insurers, successfully led the way for other companies and indus-
tries to follow. Consider each of the hurdles, how the market has
met them so far, and how much easier it would be for auditing firms
to follow suit.
First, as a preliminary matter, transaction costs can be high.
These include the costs of securities underwriting, legal advice,
accounting support, risk evaluation, rating agency assessments, and
communicating information to investors. These costs accompany any
securities offering, of course, but can be higher for IBS transactions
than for traditional corporate bond or equity offerings, and even
higher compared to conventional asset-backed securitizations. For
auditing firms, however, the real question involves comparing the
costs of IBS to the costs associated with retaining the catastrophic
risk through self-insurance programs, or laying off portions through
reinsurance arrangements. To the extent that the claimed inability
or expense of doing either is exorbitant, the costs of arranging an
IBS deal should make it cost-effective.197
Second, taxation matters. To be cost-effective, the SPE must enjoy
"pass-through" tax treatment.198 That is, if the SPE were taxed on
its income from premiums received and from investments, and
investors were likewise taxed on their investment income, the
double tax would render many SPE transactions non-cost-effective.
At present, transactions using SPEs based in the United States
197. Id. at 4. Obviously, the comparison is between transaction costs like these plus
interest costs, compared to reinsurance and self-insurance costs, as noted supra text
accompanying notes 129-34.
198. GAO, CATASTROPHE INSURANCE RISKS, supra note 186, at 27.
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result in such double taxation. True, the bonds could be offered only
to tax-exempt investors, but that is only a partial solution. A better
solution is to locate the SPE outside the United States and have no
other connections with it to avoid U.S. entity-level income taxes.'99
Many jurisdictions offer such pass-through treatment, including
Bermuda and the Cayman Islands, and most IBS SPEs are located
in those places.2 °° This should present no problem to auditing firms;
they can simply locate an SPE in the same off-shore jurisdiction in
which their SIP affiliates are located.
Third, U.S. GAAP imposes special accounting rules for SPEs. The
principal ones are the independent capital investment require-
ments. These require an SPE's outside investor to control a majority
of the equity and own at least 3 percent of the total capital in order
to permit the assets and liabilities of sponsored SPEs to be removed
from the sponsor's balance sheet. These requirements can easily be
met and probably do not matter to auditing firms, in any event,
because they do not publish public financial statements, and any
internal financial statements-or those supplied to third parties
-can provide relevant disclosure to explain the arrangement.
Fourth, insurers are subject to specialized accounting and capital
rules that regulate the circumstances under which obtaining
reinsurance generates credits for their own risk profile.2"' If they
cannot be sure that transferring risk to an SPE will entitle them to
such credits, the transactions are less appealing. This concern will
not apply to auditors or their SIP affiliates because they are not
subject to such regulation. It nevertheless is worth describing, as it
199. The National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) has lobbied to pass
legislation that would offer tax approaches to IBS akin to those enacted for Real Estate
Mortgage Investment Conduits (REMICs) and Financial Asset Securitization Investment
Trusts (FASITs). See id.
200. See id. at 26.
201. See id. at 22-23. The GAO explains:
In receiving "credit" for reinsurance, an insurance company may count the
payments owed it from the reinsurance company on claims it has paid as an
asset or as a deduction from liability. In doing so, a company can increase
earnings reported on its financial statement and lower the amount of capital it
needs to meet risk-based capital requirements established by regulators. The
ability to record an asset or to take a deduction from gross liability for
reinsurance is consequent upon the transfer of risk and can strongly affect an
insurance company's financial condition.
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is implicated and addressed in existing IBS transactions by the
approach to determining whether a catastrophe occurs, which can
vary. This variability can make audit firm IBS transactions more
attractive.
Determining whether a catastrophe occurs for an IBS transaction
essentially entails two specifications: what triggers a principal loss
and by what formula the amount is determined. For this purpose,
it is common and useful to contrast indemnity with non-indemnity
coverage. Under indemnity coverage, an insurer or reinsurer pays
claims based on those actually incurred-say, actual damages
caused by an earthquake-whereas under non-indemnity coverage,
the insurer or reinsurer pays claims based on the occurrence or non-
occurrence of a particular event that is not necessarily related to
actual incurred claims-say, an earthquake registering more than
7 on the Richter scale. Cat bond deals can be designed either way.
In reinsurance practice, insurers generally prefer indemnity
policies, as they precisely cover losses actually incurred. Re-insurers,
however, prefer non-indemnity policies to the extent that they face
risks of poor underwriting decisions or claims management by
insurers-forms of moral hazard."2 Non-indemnity approaches can
neutralize moral hazard. They tie principal repayment not to actual
claims, which may be infected by poor underwriting or by poor
claims settlement procedures, but to objective external indicia of
loss, such as a massive earthquake.2 3 The accounting treatment for
the two approaches differs under specialized accounting regulations
applicable to insurance companies. The indemnity-based approach
enables achieving so-called "underwriting accounting treatment,"
meaning the insurer has ceded its exposure and gets credit as
reinsurance-another reason that insurers generally prefer it.2"4
That accounting treatment is more difficult to achieve using non-
indemnity-based approaches. Under these approaches, the ceding
insurer is exposed to basis risk-the risk of a difference between
payments received from the reinsurance coverage and actual losses.
202. For catastrophe bond investors, oversight capability may also be limited, leading them
to favor non-indemnity models, too. See id. at 18 (noting that cat bonds have generally been
non-indemnity-based to limit moral hazard). This implication is discussed further below.
203. Any of various objective tools can be invoked, including "industry loss indexes,
parametric measures, and models of claims payments." Id. at 7.
204. Id. at 23.
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This approach can go either way, with more or less principal
received compared to losses actually incurred. To achieve underwrit-
ing accounting treatment for non-indemnity transfers, the insurer
must design the model or method used to determine the trigger and
amount so that the result bears a sufficiently close nexus to its
associated actual claims in order to justify treating it as ceded (low
basis risk).
Although these problems have caused cat bond market partici-
pants to struggle, they are essentially nonexistent for auditing
firms. Their SIP affiliates are not subject to the same regulations or
accounting rules as insurers and reinsurers. From an accounting
viewpoint, they need not worry about whether indemnity or non-
indemnity methods are superior.2 °5 They, and investors, may have
preferences as between the alternative models, but that should
make the vehicle more appealing rather than less. In particular,
experimentation and variation using the indemnity or non-indem-
nity approaches can be pursued to address various forms of moral
hazard.2"6
Fifth, investor appetites are obviously crucial to creating any IBS
transaction or market, including those for auditing firms.2 °7 Investor
appetites for IBS remain emergent rather than strong, for several
reasons. As noted, information costs can be high due to lack of
familiarity. True, the potential loss of principal in an IBS transac-
tion can be conceptually analogized to the risk of loss on corporate
bonds arising from corporate insolvency, but investors have well-
developed analytical tools for assessing that risk based on capital
structure, leverage, cash flow coverage ratios, and other traditional
205. Auditing firms may prefer non-indemnity approaches to the extent that applicable
documentation would not be subject to discovery in related litigation, whereas indemnity
agreements likely would be subject to discovery under rules permitting the discovery of
insurance policies. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b).
206. One might wonder whether applicable insurance accounting could be improved to
better capture the risk-transfer functions that securitization provides. To the extent that non-
indemnity approaches achieve risk reduction, accounting should reflect this, even if the ability
to measure or model basis risk is limited.
207. Nothing in law prevents investors, including mutual funds or other fiduciaries, from
investing in cat bonds for their own account or the account of beneficiaries. See GAO,
CATASTROPHE INSURANCE RIsKS, supra note 186, at 29 ("[The GAO] explored the potential for
individual investors to purchase shares in mutual funds that purchase catastrophe bonds for
inclusion ... in a mixed asset fund. We ... confirmed with the SEC that [applicable] rules and
regulations do not preclude mutual funds from purchasing catastrophe bonds.").
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tools. It is more difficult for even the seasoned, sophisticated
investor to assess the probability and magnitude of catastrophic
risks, whether they are hurricanes or mega-audit failures.
For IBS to appeal to investors, they must be capable of evaluating
such risk in probability and magnitude, establishing the necessary
return, and assessing how that risk-return relationship can
contribute to investment portfolio diversification. Although some
investors evidently have developed this capability and invested in
IBS, additional resources are needed. At present, two highly
specialized professional groups are available to contribute expert
assessments and translate related knowledge.
The first are risk-modeling firms, which IBS sponsors invariably
retain to provide specialized risk evaluation appraisals. Three major
catastrophe-modeling firms have long served traditional reinsurers
in assessing catastrophic risk.2 °8 They have helped to develop the
IBS market by contributing analyses for individual catastrophe
bond offerings. These firms command considerable expertise,
computing capability and statistical modeling tools. Staffed with
impressively educated professionals-many of whom hold doctoral
degrees in relevant fields-they use massive databases on past
catastrophes and related variables, such as population densities or
construction techniques, to provide state-of-the-art risk assess-
ments.2 °9
The second knowledge source is rating agencies, which invariably
are retained to rate catastrophe bonds. Three major rating agencies
have long served the bond markets in assessing investment risk:
Fitch, Moody's, and Standard & Poor's. For IBS, they incorporate
the analyses provided by the risk modelers, and then extend or
refine them and express the results in terms of investment risk.
Rating agency analyses vary, but generally assess probability of loss
and magnitude.210 Catastrophe bonds have mostly been rated non-
investment grade, although some have been rated investment grade
208. These firms are Applied Insurance Research Worldwide, Risk Management Solutions,
and EQECAT.
209. Although risk-modeling firms are often used in IBS transactions, auditors' insurance
brokers possess all related information and expertise and easily could provide requisite
analysis without need for enlisting these specialty firms.
210. Formulas may examine expected loss or frequency of loss. See GAO, CATASTROPHE
INSURANCE RISKS, supra note 186, at 21 & n.31.
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and some have been structured using multiple tranches, with the
senior tranche rated investment grade and the junior tranches rated
below that.211
Catastrophe bonds have been offered exclusively as private
placements rather than public offerings.2"2 Investors have been a
relatively small group of sophisticated institutions. Some of these
investors include mutual funds, however, so individual investors
have enjoyed an opportunity to participate indirectly in these
vehicles.2"3 Mutual fund managers, in particular, have expressed
appreciation for the diversification contribution that catastrophe
bonds can make to a portfolio.214
3. Design Requirements
Apart from the foregoing challenges to developing the market and
IBS structure, two additional design features are critical to making
an IBS transaction work and also require promoting investor
understanding. First, the SPE must be bankruptcy-remote, meaning
it would not be consolidated with the sponsor's estate in the event
of the latter's bankruptcy.2 5 Investors would remain entitled to the
contractual cash flows independent of the sponsor's financial
position, subject only to the designated catastrophic risks.
In asset-backed securitizations, such consolidation risk is
addressed mainly by assuring that the initial transfer of assets is a
"true sale" rather than a secured lending. That way, the sponsor's
creditors cannot claim any right to the transferred assets. In a
dispute, the investors would fight with the sponsor's creditors over
claims to those assets. IBS deals are easier because the sponsor
transfers no assets at the outset. Rather, an IBS sponsor's creditors
could at most claim some right to contractual payment obligations
211. Investors should not rely upon rating agencies when making investment decisions.
Still, the rating agencies can contribute potentially useful information to investor decision-
making processes.
212. See GAO, CATASTROPHE INSURANCE RISKS, supra note 186, at 18.
213. Id. at 29.
214. Id. at 5.
215. Protected Cell Acts, adopted in 1999 by Illinois and Rhode Island and endorsed by the
NAIC, provide guidance that allows insurers to create "protected cells" within existing
organizational structures to achieve bankruptcy-remoteness. 215 ILL. CoMP. STAT. ANN.
5/179(A)-25(a) (West 2007); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-64-6(a) (2007).
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that the sponsor has to the SPE, essentially premiums. This risk is
addressed by contractual provisions stating that, if the sponsor fails
to pay premiums, then the coverage terminates and all principal is
retained by the SPE for investors.
Premiums could cease in two different scenarios. First, they could
cease because of sponsor insolvency after a covered loss occurs. In
that case, the coverage is triggered and the funds are released
pursuant to the contract. No fight with sponsor creditors occurs.
Alternatively, premiums could cease because of insolvency arising
for other reasons. In that case, the coverage is not triggered and the
SPE would seek to retain the funds for payment to investors. This
scenario can create competition with the sponsor's other creditors.
Accordingly, ex ante assurance of bankruptcy remoteness remains
important in IBS transactions.216
This point leads to a second requisite design feature for effective
IBS deals and related investor understanding. In asset-backed
securitizations, investor principal upon closing is transferred to the
sponsor in exchange for assets. In IBS, reflecting the characteristic
of an insurance arrangement, investor principal upon closing is held
in the SPE and invested. So in the former, the SPE is essentially
passive, holding the assets and servicing them, with the servicing
usually outsourced by contract back to the sponsor. For IBS, the
SPE is more active; it holds assets, invests them, manages receipt
of premiums, and evaluates and settles claims arising under the
coverage. This requires attention to the SPE's identity and manage-
ment.
In particular, the SPE must be managed by experts possessing
appropriate investment and management skill. Those managers
must follow management and investment principles that assure the
SPE's safety and soundness. As examples, they must assure that
bond proceeds are invested prudently, assure that premiums are
216. For asset-backed securitizations sponsored by banks and other commercial
enterprises, the usual bankruptcy law is the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, but, for IBS sponsors and
perhaps their SPEs, state bankruptcy law governs in accordance with state insurance
regulations. See 11 U.S.C. § 109(b)(2) (2006) (stating that a "domestic insurance company" is
not eligible to be a debtor under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, although not defining "domestic
insurance company"); In re Estate of Medicare HMO, 998 F.2d 436, 445 (7th Cir. 1993) ("The
essential attribute of an insurance company under Illinois law, and the attribute prompting
deference to state regulation, is the assumption [by the company in question] of a third party's
risk for a premium.").
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paid from the sponsor when due, and assure that swap payments
of the swap counterparty are paid when due.217 Assuring these traits
and performance of these duties is principally a market problem;
investors must scrutinize the manager and the management
contract and avoid investing absent sufficient assurance of safety
and soundness.21
4. Illustration and Assessment
Consider for illustration a simple example of an IBS auditing
transaction sponsored by one of the four large auditing firms, say
Deloitte. Deloitte's SIP affiliate creates a bankruptcy-remote SPE
based in Bermuda. The deal provides insurance to the Deloitte
affiliate for the ensuing twelve months covering specified audit-
related events occurring during that period. Investors contribute
$250 million of the principal amount in exchange for a floating
interest rate of LIBOR plus 7 percent.
Investor risk of loss is either indemnity-based or non-indemnity-
based. If indemnity-based, it could provide that investors lose
principal dollar-for-dollar if, during those twelve months, Deloitte
settles or is adjudged liable in a single lawsuit alleging audit
failure in which settlement or damages exceed $500 million. If non-
indemnity-based, principal reductions could be determined by
reference to any of various objective indicators outside the firm's
direct control. For example, if total settlements by or judgments
against public auditing firms in the United States exceed $2 billion
during that twelve-month period, then investors would release
dollar-for-dollar in excess of that up to the total $250 million
principal invested.2"9 In either case, an independent agent must be
217. See Frankel & LaPlume, supra note 190, at 204.
218. SPE management also can be a regulatory problem to the extent that state insurance
regulation may apply to the SPE. This probably is not a problem in general, but is not free
from doubt. See id. at 209-10. For insurers, at least, a Model Act drafted by the National
Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) ordains the Special Purpose Reinsurance
Vehicle (SPRV). The Model Act expressly provides that associated bonds are not insurance
contracts, yet allows that sponsoring insurers can create the SPRVs using corporate
subsidiaries that are engaged in the "business of insurance." Additional issues in structuring
securitization transactions, whether asset-backed or insurance-based, include avoiding
triggering the Investment Company Act and complying with other federal securities and
commodities laws. See id. at 208-20.
219. As the example suggests, the indemnity approach reposes some discretion in the
[Vol. 49:711774
SECURITIZING AUDIT FAILURE RISK
appointed to verify that a triggering event has occurred, akin to the
provision in standard insurance agreements providing that an
insured cannot agree to settle a claim without the insurer's assent.
Proceeds from the securities issuance are deposited into a
collateral trust account and invested in U.S. government guaran-
teed securities or highly rated commercial paper, and the SPE
enters into a suitable interest-rate swap with a credit-worthy
counterparty. The securities are offered only to qualified institu-
tional buyers as defined in SEC Rule 144A.22° The bonds are rated,
based in part on a risk analysis of a catastrophe-modeling firm and
in part on rating agencies' own investment risk assessment
models.221
Catastrophic risks are peculiar in that their frequency is low but
their magnitude is huge. The consequence of this peculiarity for
insurers is that the cost of reinsurance can be significantly higher
than for other pools. For some coverage, this can mean that
reinsurers simply lack sufficient capital to meet aggregate risks.
An example concerns the risk of floods in certain coastal environ-
ments, and explains why the U.S. government developed govern-
ment-backed flood insurance programs. In such contexts, insurance
securitization can be particularly appealing. It vastly expands the
private capital available to meet aggregate risks beyond the limits
of reinsurers into the vastly greater limits of the capital markets
themselves.
auditing firm and can create skewed incentives in settlement negotiations or litigation
strategies that the non-indemnity method more readily can avoid. As the example also
suggests, these and many other contractual terms require specification on a scale akin to
terms contained in manuscript and reinsurance policies. The details are omitted here in the
interest of introducing the IBS concept for catastrophic audit failure risk, but not fully
delineating it.
220. Private Resales of Securities to Institutions, 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A(q)(1) (2007).
221. Compare this illustration with the actual transaction in Redwood Capital I, Ltd.,
sponsored by Lehman Re, a reinsurance company. GAO, CATASTROPHE INSURANCE RISKS,
supra note 186, at 21-22. It provided insurance for twelve months covering specified
earthquake losses to property in California. Investors were exposed to potential loss of
principal of $160 million. The bonds bore a floating interest rate of LIBOR +5.5 percent and
LIBOR +7 percent. Investor risk of loss was non-indemnity based. Any principal reductions
were to be determined by reference to the Property Claim Services (PCS) index, a recognized
industry indicator of insured property for catastrophic losses. The SPE provided reinsurance
coverage for California earthquake risk for triggering events causing industry losses ranging
from $22.5 billion to $31.5 billion as PCS reports estimated for the period. Moody's rated the
bond Ba2 (non-investment grade).
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For auditing, to the extent that it is true that audit firms, their
SIP affiliates, or reinsurers lack sufficient capital resources to
meet catastrophic risks, it is appealing to consider devices to
transfer and distribute that risk to the broader base of the capital
markets. This adds an additional layer of insurance on top of
primary insurance, self-insurance, and reinsurance and taps not
just insurance markets, but capital markets, too. This expands
pooling and distribution of risk and increases diversification
compared to traditional insurance.222 Adding IBS to address
catastrophic risks of audit failure also should reduce the volatility
in insurance markets that auditors have faced for decades, and that
is an important basis for the insurance-based arguments in favor of
establishing ex ante damages caps on auditor liability for audit
failure.
Risks of adverse selection essentially disappear because any given
auditing cat bond issue is based on the risks facing a single auditing
firm, even though it is composed of many members in the network.
Risks of moral hazard are addressed in several ways. First, the
IBS layer is designed for the catastrophic event, not the quotidian
case. External insurance and SIPs cover the main risks. As in
the preceding illustration, IBS for auditing transactions sets the
effective coverage as a designated dollar amount, say, $250 million,
in excess of an underlying amount covered by other insurance,
including self-insurance, such as $500 million. Second, the indem-
nity or non-indemnity features relating to the payout trigger and
amounts can be tailored accordingly. Finally, there should remain
sufficient risk independence and risk variability to enable the
product to function effectively as insurance.223 Of course, some moral
hazard will remain even after taking account of these tools. 224
222. IBS expands capacity beyond that available using E&O or SIPs, although not
necessarily compared to using FSI. As noted earlier, the risks that FSI insures can be hedged
using option markets. See Ronen, supra note 51, at 54; supra note 184 and accompanying text.
223. Catastrophe bonds covering natural catastrophic events such as earthquakes and
floods usually tend to satisfy the condition of statistical independence. See Frankel &
LaPlume, supra note 190, at 205. Auditing bonds relating to insurance covering audit failure
should satisfy the condition as well. So long as there is no correlation--or the correlation is
not strong-between substantive business and economic risks and the risk of audit failure,
then securitized bonds should offer investment diversification.
224. As noted, FSI reduces moral hazard almost to the vanishing point when accompanied
by the hedging strategy that uses options that apply to the stock of a specific audit client and
can be priced accordingly. See Ronen, supra note 51, at 54, 56-57; see also supra Part III.A.2.
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For insurers or auditors, funding IBS bond interest and distribut-
ing loss risk to investors is functionally equivalent to the cost they
would incur if they chose to distribute the risk using traditional
reinsurance policies. If IBS can attract investors at interest rates in
the range of, say, LIBOR plus 7 percent, as they have in the general
catastrophe bond market, then this will be attractive so long as
actual or functional reinsurance costs are greater than that.
The interest rate demanded on auditing cat bonds of the various
firms reflects the relative degree of risk each firm faces. This
introduces the numerous advantages of capital market discipline.
First, because audit failure losses are paid, in part, by capital
market investors, capital market monitoring of auditing firm
performance appears. This amounts to a sort of re-bundling of the
risk monitoring and risk distribution functions. The capital markets
as a whole effectively self-insure.
Second, investors will require auditing firms to furnish more
information than they presently do concerning loss exposure. Note,
however, that the required information is not the auditors' assets
or net worth or other information provided in financial statements,
but rather the firms' historical loss risk experience-such as law-
suits filed and settled or regulatory investigations conducted and
resolved. Auditors may be willing to share some information
despite their traditional unwillingness to disclose publicly complete
financial information. After all, these transactions would be private
placements, thus limiting public disclosure, and the required
disclosure would relate to risks of catastrophic loss without
requiring the complete financial statements that firms consider to
be proprietary.
Third, this would redefine the relationship between auditing
firms and capital market investors. At present, capital market
investors may too often treat auditing firms as insurers of financial
reporting, despite limited auditor ability to perform that function
and limited resources to support it. When investors buy auditing
firm cat bonds, they have an additional direct interest in reducing
the frequency and magnitude of audit failure. In addition to
increased monitoring of audit firm performance, this could induce
In contrast, an IBS transaction is a strategy applicable to all of an issuing audit firm's clients
and would be priced on the basis of that entire book of business.
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monitoring and control over plaintiffs' lawyers to deter pursuing
excessive damages claims against auditors, which is an important
adjunct of the insurance-based arguments favoring damages caps
for auditors.
Securitizing audit failure risk could also contribute to curbing the
problem of pocket shifting prevalent in securities fraud class actions
today. This occurs when an issuer suffering market price drops due
to financial misstatement pays one class of shareholders at the
expense of another class, depending on fortuities of the timing of
stock trades.225 With IBS for auditing, at least for federal securities
class actions against auditors for audit failure, the pocket shifting
may persist but an additional cash flow stream enters. In this cash
flow stream, funds flow out of one pocket and back into that same
pocket.226 True, significant transaction and agency costs remain,
especially in lawyers' fees. But the current critique of pocket shifting
worries about how the shift is from one pocket of shareholders to a
different pocket of shareholders. With IBS for auditing, the pocket,
through self-insurance, stays in substantially the same position-
the net of transaction and agency costs.
In addition, an IBS transaction is relatively simple for an
auditing firm to complete compared to the political and structural
challenges necessary either to establish caps on damages or
implement novel reforms such as adopting a regime of financial
statement insurance. True, some political resistance may appear,
but it likely can be overcome. For example, the Reinsurance
Association of America views IBS as a direct competitor; thus, it has
emphasized in lobbying efforts that the reinsurance industry has
abundant capacity to address these risks, and that IBS should be
seen at most as a supplement, not an alternative, to reinsurance.2
27
225. See Coffee, supra note 66, at 1557-58.
226. Suppose that a mutual fund (Fund) buys common stock of a large industrial
corporation (Issuer), which is, in turn, audited by a large auditing firm (Firm). Suppose Fund
also buys one-year Firm IBS. If no audit failure occurs by Firm at Issuer during that year,
Fund enjoys its return on Issuer's stock, uninfected by audit failure, plus a high bond interest
return and return of principal on the Firm IBS. But if an audit failure does occur during that
year, Fund suffers a reduced return on its Issuer stock and principal on the bonds, if, and only
if, that same amount is used to fund reimbursement to it of its losses on Issuer stock. It is far
from a perfect hedge, but it reduces the naked risk of owning Issuer stock without any other
financial instrument related to the quality of its audits.
227. See GAO, CATASTROPHE INSURANCE RISKS, supra note 186, at 28, 30.
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On the other side, the Bond Market Association (BMA) is enthusias-
tic about IBS; it discounts concerns about why investors may not
find IBS attractive and urges increasing their appeal through more
favorable federal income tax treatment.22 Auditing firms that find
IBS enticing will enjoy a similar reception: the BMA will welcome
them, but the RAA and the reinsurers of the firms' SIP affiliates
may demur.229
Finally, simply adding IBS to the policy discussion may contrib-
ute value. At present, proponents of damages caps have incentives,
when in doubt, to interpret information in ways that overstate the
stakes. The leading example is the assertion that the prevalence of
self-insurance is due to the unavailability or expense of external
insurance, a claim that the foregoing analysis suggests may be
overstated. Notably, auditing firms have a comparative advantage
in these debates as they and their insurers and insurance brokers
command all the related information on loss histories and risk
evaluation and hold most of it confidential. Using this information
in the political arena to campaign for liability caps creates incen-
tives to overstate risks. In contrast, using such information in the
marketplace to sell cat bonds creates incentives to understate risks.
Simply by adding IBS as a serious policy option, the two effects may
offset one another as market incentives meet political ones.
CONCLUSION
Policy debate over capping auditor damages in securities
litigation, dating to the 1970s, implicates the perennial issue
concerning the relative expense or limited availability to auditors of
external insurance. As evidence, proponents cite the contraction of
E&O markets for auditing insurance and the rise of auditing firm
self-insurance programs. Analysis of this insurance-based argument
suggests that it is overstated in that self-insurance is better at
promoting audit effectiveness, and financial statement insurance
228. See id. at 31.
229. Also appealing about IBS for auditing firms, moreover, is how deals can be structured
to fit into the existing insurance matrix. Bonds would be issued to cover losses that exceed
insurance capacity. So insurers would not lose any underwriting business. Furthermore, note
that cat bonds do not attract new lawsuits against auditors for the same reason-they only
provide coverage for catastrophic losses.
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would be better yet. The legitimate target in the debate is the threat
of catastrophic risks, mega cases that would destroy a firm and
jeopardize the auditing industry. That concern might be addressed
by caps, but this has been a political and policy thicket for nearly
forty years.
The concern and analysis entice asking: what else besides caps
might be used? After all, the problem is not sui generis and caps are
not the only solution. Catastrophic risks with limited or expensive
insurance or reinsurance arise from natural phenomena like
hurricanes, earthquakes, floods, and tornadoes. Some such events
-like Hurricane Andrew and the Northridge Earthquake-rivet
insurers and yield very hard insurance markets. In response to
those two events, in particular, insurers and other businesses
turned to the capital markets and invented insurance-based
securitization as an alternative or supplement to reinsurance. This
innovation can be adapted easily to the auditing context. Firms
likely would be better off-and their contributions to financial
reporting more effective-by pursuing catastrophe bond securi-
tizations rather than continuing the campaign to secure caps on
damages that they face for audit failure.
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